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date: 20 February 2020

Abstract and Keywords

Richard Rorty articulates and upholds the received view of the relationship between pragmatism and analytic philosophy, which is that when logical empiricism became the dominant force in American philosophy departments, it bullied and chased out the home-grown pragmatism. This chapter shows that many of the central tenets of logical empiricism were already present in early American pragmatism and it is only when Rorty resolutely followed a less rigorous version of pragmatism did things go awry. It first looks at Chauncey Wright’s views on mathematics, science, and metaphysics. It then considers C. S. Peirce’s arguments about logic and science, William James’s concept of pragmatism, John Dewey’s position on logical empiricism, and W. V. O. Quine’s take on empiricism, naturalism, and holism.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, John Dewey, William James, logical empiricism, naturalism, C. S. Peirce, pragmatism, W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, Chauncey Wright

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