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date: 22 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the continuing relevance of logical empiricist philosophy of science. After an initial outline of its basic doctrines and often misunderstood impetus it is shown how the reception of some of its most distinctive features was distorted by two books that were prima facie sympathetic to its cause. The internal dynamics of the development of the Circle’s theories are then discussed by reference to various attempts to comprehend the objectivity of science and to arrive at a suitably compehensive conception of philosophy of science.

Keywords: logical empiricism, logical positivism, philosophy of science, anti-metaphysics, physicalism, unity of science, anti-foundationalism, philosophical deflationism

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