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date: 15 May 2021

Abstract and Keywords

The design of incentives and the evaluation of their impact are examined in the research literature at many different levels. This article provides a background and a conceptual framework relating to the effects of payment incentives on the behavior of health care providers. It then summarizes the empirical literature on the effect of financial incentives in health care. The article offers a conceptual model of the provider's choice of the quantity and quality of output as a means of organizing our thinking about the effects of specific provider payment incentives. This article addresses the effect of general provider payment incentives on the amount and type of care provided; the evidence that general payment incentives have indirectly affected quality of care; and the impact of payment incentive programs that attempt specifically to reward providers for improving quality of care, or for achieving specific benchmark levels of quality.

Keywords: incentives, payment, health care providers, conceptual model, quality

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