Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 23 February 2020

Abstract and Keywords

The purpose of this article is to consider the implications of the theoretical and empirical literature on physician behavior and the payment for the design of a payment system to finance a medical home. It states that an analysis of physician behavior implies primary care physicians should be paid by a combination of an enrollment-based prospective payment, and fees related to procedures. As in many areas of health economics designing such a system involves issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. This article is concerned with the moral hazard component: designing a payment system to convey appropriate incentives to supply care. It makes some preliminary comments on the implications for dealing with selection in the upfront enrollment payment associated with the medical home.

Keywords: payment system, primary care, health economics, physician behavior, medical home

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.