- About the Authors
- Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology
- The Thing Called Emotion
- Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life
- The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science
- Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
- Stoicism and Epicureanism
- Emotions in Medieval Thought
- A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain
- Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre
- Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology
- Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
- Why Be Emotional?
- Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo‐Jamesian Accounts
- Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear
- The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life
- Saying It
- Epistemic Emotions
- Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions
- A Plea for Ambivalence
- Emotion, Self‐/Other‐Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective
- Emotions and Values
- An Ethics of Emotion?
- The Moral Emotions
- Learning Emotions and Ethics
- Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation
- Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect
- Expression in the Arts
- Affects in Appreciation
- Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?
- Emotions, Art, and Immorality
Abstract and Keywords
Two major themes characterize the study of emotions in modern philosophy and psychology. One is the identification of emotions with feelings. The other is the treatment of emotions as intentional states of mind, that is, states of mind that are directed at or toward some object. Each theme corresponds to a different concept of emotions. Accordingly, the study has divided, for the most part, into two main lines of investigation. On one, emotions are conceived of as principally affective states. The concept on which this line proceeds is feeling-centered. On the other, emotions are conceived of as principally cognitive states. The concept on which this line proceeds is thought-centered. Both concepts reflect revolutionary changes in the theoretical study of emotions that began to take place at the end of the nineteenth century and continued for several decades into the twentieth.
John Deigh is professor of law and philosophy. He is the author of The Sources of Moral Agency (1996), Emotions, Values and the Law. 2008), and An Introduction to Ethics. 2010). He was the editor of Ethics from 1997-2008.
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