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date: 03 August 2020

(p. ix) List of Figures

(p. ix) List of Figures

  1. 1.1 Micro–macro relations as supervenience relations 10

  2. 1.2 Macro dynamics from a supervenience perspective 11

  3. 1.3 Individual preferences and neighborhood segregation 13

  4. 1.4 The structure of a sexual network in an American high school 15

  5. 2.1 Generality, isolation, and the defining characteristics of middle-range theories 29

  6. 2.2 Coleman’s micro–macro scheme 33

  7. 2.3 Jon Elster’s two-filter model 34

  8. 2.4 Analytical distinctions introduced in Merton’s analysis of the unanticipated consequences of social action 35

  9. 2.5 The logic of self-fulfilling prophecies and Matthew effects 39

  10. 3.1 The standard model of rational choice 53

  11. 3.2 A model of emotional choice 56

  12. 3.3 The ultimatum game 60

  13. 3.4 Patterns of decay of emotion 61

  14. 3.5 Causes of ‘short-termism’ 69

  15. 7.1 Three siblings’ responses to a test on the hundred largest cities in Germany 147

  16. 7.2 Accuracy of the decision rules tested by Czerlinski, Goldstein, and Gigerenzer (1999) in fitting versus prediction 154

  17. 7.3 Distribution of knowledge in a ‘hidden profile’ scenario 157

  18. 7.4 Individual and social learning as modeled by Todd and Dieckmann (2005) and Garcia-Retamero, Takezawa, and Gigerenzer (2006) 161

  19. 7.5 Correct inferences under various social learning rules after a hundred paired comparisons 162

  20. 8.1 A signaling model in which two signalers face different costs to emit the same signal intensity (after Johnstone 1997) 176

  21. 8.2 A signaling model in which two signalers obtain different benefits from the same receiver’s response (after Johnstone 1997) 178

  22. 8.3 Genealogy of signaling theory 187

  23. (p. x) 9.1 Social and moral norms 197

  24. 12.1 Two hypothetical decision rules 283

  25. 12.2 Hypothetical relationship between housing costs and household resources 288

  26. 13.1 Sums invested in Ponzi’s scheme, 1920 304

  27. 14.1 Schematic of proposed cumulative-advantage model 320

  28. 14.2 Schematic of the experimental design for experiments 1–3 322

  29. 14.3 Screenshots of song menu from experiments 1 and 2–4 323

  30. 14.4 Listening-choice plots for experiments 1 and 2 325

  31. 14.5 Inequality in success, as measured by the Gini coefficient, in experiments 1 and 2 326

  32. 14.6 Unpredictability of success in experiments 1 and 2 327

  33. 14.7 Relationship between appeal and success 329

  34. 14.8 Spearman’s rank correlation between appeal and success 330

  35. 14.9 Listening-choice plots for experiment 3 332

  36. 14.10 Inequality and unpredictability of success in experiment 3 333

  37. 14.11 Schematic of social-influence worlds in experiment 4 334

  38. 14.12 Success dynamics for song 1 and song 48 and for song 2 and song 47 335

  39. 16.1 Representative simulated networks at varying levels of homophily 379

  40. 16.2 Employer-preference regimes and labor-market segregation under full information 381

  41. 16.3 Levels of firm segregation across five experimental regimes 382

  42. 18.1 Three common conditional decision rules 426

  43. 19.1 An order-rule model for dominance hierarchy 451

  44. 19.2 Potential resolutions of an unbalanced triad 452

  45. 19.3 Triad transition space for directed relations 454

  46. 19.4 Effect of edge timing on diffusion potential 458

  47. 19.5 A time ordering for a two-regular graph that minimizes reachability 458

  48. 19.6 Time-sample space for monogamy and concurrency 459

  49. 19.7 Effect of concurrency on the symmetry of indirect relations 460

  50. 19.8 Possible time sets for potential four-cycles 463

  51. 19.9 Cocktail-party mean reachability 465

  52. 19.10 Effect of rewiring on mean distance in a dynamic small-world model 467

  53. 20.1 Granovetter’s threshold model of collective action 483

  54. 20.2 The cascade window for random networks 486

  55. 20.3 Spread of influence throughout a network via vulnerable nodes 486

  56. (p. xi) 20.4 Example of a random-group network 488

  57. 20.5 Example of the generalized-affiliation model, where each node has attributes in two dimensions 489

  58. 20.6 Mean size of activation events for random-group networks and generalized-affiliation networks for three seeds 491

  59. 21.1 Example of a space–time cube 503

  60. 22.1 Equilibrium resulting from differential association 524

  61. 22.2 Equilibrium resulting from selective ties 525

  62. 22.3 An individual (e) participating in three foci (A, B, C) with other people 531

  63. 22.4 Individuals a through k connected to one another through foci 532

  64. 22.5 Six individuals with combinations of six traits connected by three foci 534

  65. 24.1 The prior-attributes hypothesis 570

  66. 24.2 The four possible sequences for the first two dominance relationships in a component triad 574

  67. 24.3 Music-notation summary of the interactions observed during the first two hours of the first day of observations on group Q6 581

  68. 26.1 Schelling diagram 632

  69. 30.1 The dynamics of culture and structure 724