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date: 30 May 2020

(p. 751) Subject Index

(p. 751) Subject Index

abduction 76
abstract mechanism schemes 7
Abu Ghraib 68 action:
and beliefs 72
and conditional decision-making 424–5
and emotions:
direct impact of 57–8
emotional choice 54–7
impact on formal preferences 62–7
impact on substantive preferences 58–62 and explanation of 96
and explanation of phenomena 9
and intentionality 72, 94–5
and preferences 95, 96–7
and rational choice 53
and structure 546
and unanticipated consequences 35–7
and urgency 63–6
and wants 95
Adolescent Health, Longitudinal Study of 674, 675, 676, 678
aesthetics 559
affirmative action 121
agent-based computational (ABC) modeling 246
and advantages of 264
and agent-based nature of 246–7
and agents’ features: adaptive 247
autonomous 247
embedded in networks 247
heterogeneity 247
heuristic 247
interdependence 247
and applications of 247
and computational nature of 247
and danger of complexity 263
and danger of simplicity 263
and equation-based models 255
multivariate linear models 256
and game theory 252
behavioral assumptions 252–3
structural assumptions 253–5
and limitations of 261
and macrosocial complexity 262
and methodological individualism 249
backward-looking rationality 249–51
and methodological principles 261–4
and microsocial simplicity 262
and origins of 246
and process of developing 264
and residential segregation 286–7
and social liberalism 256–61
and theoretical modeling 247–8
agreeableness, and personality 102
alliance mechanism, and conflict 609–11
allocative discrimination, and employment 131–3
altruism 392, 401
and unconditional action 429
analogical reasoning:
and analytical ethnography 702
and belief formation 80–3 criteria for 81
overreliance 82
selection bias 82–3
and categorization 81
analysis of variance (ANOVA) 140
analytical ethnography 689, 690–2
and analytical sociology 688–9, 706–8
and bridging micro-macro-meso levels 689, 706–7
and clarification of 692
and compatibility with analytical sociology 698–700
dissection and abstraction 700
explanation 698–700
precision and clarity 700–1
theory of action 701–2
and debates within 692
and ethnography:
critical ethnography 690, 691 (p. 752)
location within 690
participant observation 690
and formal theory 691, 692, 693
crime 694–5
dissent 697–8
reproduction of change, economic system 695
reproduction of social hierarchy and inequality 696
and meaning of 690–1
and mechanism-based explanation 689, 693–4, 706–8
crime 694–5
dissent 697–8
emotions 694
extended-case method 695
macro level 695, 696
micro level 694
micro-meso-macro levels 697–8
reproduction of change, economic system 695
reproduction of social hierarchy and inequality 696
and opposition to 691
response to 691–2
and strength of 708
and substantive theory 691, 692
and teaching systematic methods 692
and theoretical explanations 689
and theoretical integration with analytical sociology:
analogical reasoning 702
Challenger disaster 704
comparing research at different levels 702
comparing research at same levels 702
corporate malfeasance 703
cross-case comparison 702
intimate relationships 703–4
signals 703–6
status dynamics 705
trust 705
and theory generation 691, 692
analytical sociology:
and actions 9
and analytical ethnography 688–9, 706–8
and belief formation, lessons of the past 81–2
and causal depth 8–9
and compatibility with analytical ethnography 698–700
dissection and abstraction 700
explanation 698–700
precision and clarity 700–1 theory of action 701–2
and ethnography 688–9
and explaining social facts 3
and historical sociology 712
and mechanism explanations 4–8
abstract mechanism schemes 7
core idea 5
definitions of mechanism 5, 6
difference from statistical approaches 6
selection mechanisms 7–8
semigeneral mechanisms 6–7
and micro-macro relationship 9–13, 32–3
complex models 14–16
macro-to-micro linkages 33–4
micro-to-macro linkages 35–7
and rational choice theory 22 n1
and relations 9
and structural individualism 4, 8
and theoretical integration with analytical ethnography:
analogical reasoning 702
Challenger disaster 704
comparing research at different levels 702
comparing research at same levels 702
corporate malfeasance 703
cross-case comparison 702
intimate relationships 703–4
signals 703–6
status dynamics 705
trust 705
and understanding macro-level phenomena 688
and understanding social world 3–4
anger 58, 60, 61
animals, and emotions 51
anomie 34
argument patterns 7
assortative mating 367
Australia, and constitutional conventions 210, 213
availability heuristic, and analogical reasoning 82
avoidance, and social norms 199–200
bank runs, and self-fulfilling prophecies 294, 297, 299, 303–4, 306
Barnesian performativity 294
barter economies 230
(p. 753) behavior:
and distinction from action 72
and intentionality 72, 94–5
and wants 95
behavioral economics, and game theoretic experiments 639
behavioral game theory 626, 628, 633
and marital-investment game 633–4
and new developments:
aggregate outcomes 660
neuroscience 660
behavioral genetics, and personality traits 107
belief formation 73, 89
and analogical reasoning 80–3
criteria for 81
lessons of the past 81–2
overreliance 82
selection bias 82–3
and categorization 74–7
framing effects 75–6
inferences 76
observations 74–5
and cognitive strategies 74
and dissonance reduction 87–9
belief tightness 88
centrality of beliefs 88–9
and doubt 74
and epistemic authorities 75, 79, 83–4
and inductive reasoning 77–80
conditional probability 78–9
logical invalidity 77–8, 79
and mechanisms of 73
and social influences on 83–7
in black-box (uncertain) situations 83–4
conformity 84–6
epistemic authorities 83–4
imitation 84
pluralistic ignorance 84, 86–7
and socio-cognitive framework 73–4
belief systems 88
beliefs:
and action 72
and certainty/doubt continuum 74
and definition of 73
and descriptive beliefs 89 n2
and emotions 56, 67
biased beliefs 67
inadequate information 68
low-quality beliefs 68
and evaluative beliefs 89 n2
and factual beliefs 89 n2
and rational choice 53, 54
and self-fulfilling prophecies 294–5
betrayal aversion 647
and institutional design 648–9
and status 647–8
binary actions, and conditional
decision-making 424–5
biotechnology industry 556, 557
bloggers, and social influence 480
boot-strapped induction 294
Bosnia 602
bounded rationality 143
bureaucracies:
and Matthew effect 553
and status 550
business networks, and trust, 229
calendars, and time segregation 512
Canada, and constitutional conventions 210, 211
cascades:
and networks with group structure 489–92
and observational learning 631
and random networks 485–7
categorical actions, and conditional
decision-making 424–5
categorization:
and analogical reasoning 81
and belief formation 74–7
and framing effects 75–6
and inferences 76
and observations 74–5
causal inference, and surveys 679–82
causal laws, and explanation 41
causal mechanisms 42
Challenger disaster 704
Chicago School 667
child abuse scandals 79
China, and trust networks 230
choice:
and opportunity 115, 116, 120, 136
classical decision-making 117
expansion of 119
interdependent decision-making 117–18
preference adaptation 119–20
restriction of 119
and recognition heuristic 145–9
and segregation 270
and social structure 33–4
Christianity, and time segregation 511
civil rights, and opportunity 115
civil war 595
and alliance mechanism 609–11
and central/local tensions 610
(p. 754) and collaboration 607
and concentration 608
and distribution of popular support 605–6
and distribution of violence 607
and endogenous violence 606
and fusion of group and individual level dynamics 609–10
and guerrilla war 607
and institutional environment 606–7
and interpersonal conflict 607–8
and local issues 608–9
and polarization 601–2
as consequence of conflict 606
and selective violence 607
class conflict 599, 600, 602–4
and polarization 601
cocktail-party problem, and network dynamics 464–6
cognitive revolution 141
collective action:
and actors’ consciousness 410–11
and analytical models 392, 394
and analytical-sociology perspective 393–4
and behavioral experiments 392
and characteristics of activists 410–11
and co-currence of identity and interest 394, 401–2, 408
and collective good 391, 392, 394
and collective identity 402
origin of 403–4, 408
and collective interest 399
inherent in individuals’ choice 400
origin of 403–4, 408
and conflict over goals of 404–5, 407
and contentious politics perspective 393–4
and coordination 397, 399
and decision-making:
multiple levels of 409–10
noncentralized 409
and empirical research 393–5
and evolutionary approach 401
and formal modeling of 398
nonordinary forms 396
and free-rider problem 392, 397, 399
not default position 399–400
and game theory 397–8
public-goods game 400
and individual and collective interests 399
and interdependence between actors 397
and interest formation 402
and interpersonal influence 405, 406, 407
opinion change 407–8
and meaning of 391–2
and network structure 405–6
dynamic networks 406
and nonordinary forms of 395
difficulty in studying 395–6
and ordinary forms of 395
predictability 395–6
and organized groups 409
and participation identities 402
and problem of 392, 397–9
and reciprocity 400
and resource-mobilization theory 393
and social influence 476–7
cascade-seeding strategies 489–92
generalized-affiliation networks 488–9
Granovetter’s ‘all-to-all’ models 482–4
random networks 484–7
random-group networks 487–8
threshold models 481–2
and social movements 393
and tragedy of the commons 392
collective identity, and conflict 594
commensuration 558, 559–60
commission bias 64–5
communication:
and cooperation 652
and pluralistic ignorance 86–7
and signaling theory 168
competence, and trust 223
compliance, and action conformity/belief
nonconformity 85–6
conditional decision-making:
and dynamic of models 423–4
action types 424–5
conditional-decision rules 425–8
critical point 424
fixed threshold rule 425
focal point matching 425
initial state of activity 428–9
linear (mean)matching 425, 426
and examples of 419
and explanation of social action 437–8
and explanations of 420
and glossary of terms 421–3
and meaning of 420–1
and models of 440–1
and resistance to influence 429
fixed actions 432
fixed-decision rules 431–2
memory 432
partial resistance 430–1
threshold models 432–3
unconditional actors 429–30
(p. 755) as social fact 438
and social interaction 433
friendship selection 436
group size 433–4
local-network structure 434–5
social cleavages 435–6
social location of influentials 436–7
and stable outcome states 420–1
conditional probability 78–9
conflict:
and action 594
and belief conformity 86
and civil war 595
alliance mechanism 609–11
central/local tensions 610
collaboration 607
concentration 608
distribution of popular support 605–6
distribution of violence 607
endogenous violence 606
fusion of group and individual level dynamics 609–10
guerrilla war 607
institutional environment 606–7
interpersonal conflict 607–8
local issues 608–9
polarization 601–2
polarization as consequence of 606
selective violence 607
and class conflict 599, 600, 602–4
polarization 601
and collective action 404–5
and collective identity 594
and contentious action 595
and definition of 594
and democratic institutions 595, 604
and diverse forms of 595
and ethnic conflict 599–600
group-level dynamics 600
nationalism 600
polarization 601
postcolonialism 600
and fragmentation 592, 593
and function of 594
and group conflict, polarization 600–2
and group-level dynamics 593
and heterogeneity of 599
and interaction between group and individual
action 594, 597, 611
and intergroup violence 599
and interpersonal conflict 597–9
escalation into group violence 598, 599
group solidarity 598–9
hierarchies 598
intimate nature of 598
in Iraq 592–3, 596
and micro-level dynamics 593
and motivations 592, 593
and non-violent conflict 595
and polarization 593
as consequence of conflict 606
relationship with conflict intensity 605
and political parties 603–4
and politics 595, 601
and study of:
fragmentation of 595–6
group-level perspective 596
individual-level perspective 596
methodological divide 596
and violent conflict 595
civil war 595
criminal violence 595
riots and pogroms 595
scale 595
war 595
conformity:
and belief formation 84–5
compliance 85–6
internalization 85
and diffusion processes 86
and network autocorrelation
child-rearing case study 526–7
differential association/influence 524
and social influence 476
conscientiousness, and personality 102
consequentialist motivations, and social
norms 214
conspicuous consumption 475–6
and signaling theory 186–90
constitutional conventions 209–13
contagion, and influence-response function 479
contempt 59
and social norms 199, 200, 201
contentious politics 595
and collective action 393–4
contingency, and historical sociology 720–1
continuous actions, and conditional
decision-making 424–5
conventions, and social norms 198
cooperation:
and communication 652
and game theoretic experiments 649
and game theory 253, 397–8
and public-goods game 400
and trust 219
alternatives to 233–5
coordination, and collective action 397, 399
corruption, and trust networks 232–3
counterfactual dependencies 41–2
crime, and mechanism-based explanation 694–5
criminal violence 595
critical ethnography 690, 691
Croatia 602
crowd behavior, and social influence 476
cultural markets:
and cumulative advantage 319–20
and inequality of success in 316
and music download experiment 320–2
individual behavior 324
inequality of success 324–6
replication of 331
role of appeal 328–31
self-fulfilling prophecies 305, 332–6
unpredictability of success 326–8
varying strength of social signal 322–31
and social influence 315, 317
influence on choice 318–19
Mona Lisa 336–7
and unpredictability of 316–17
cumulative advantage, and cultural
markets 319–20
Dawes’s rule 152–4
day-care centers 546–7
decision-making:
and adaptive decision maker 144
and binary-choice models 478
and bounded rationality 143
and cognitive costs 143
and collective action 409–10
and fast-and-frugal heuristics 144–5
environmental structure 163
limitations of 161–2
and group decision-making 155
heuristic methods 158–9
hidden profile task 156–8
recognition heuristic 155–6
and heuristics 144
and influence-response function 479
and information costs 143
and knowledge-based inference 149–50
minimalist heuristic 150–1, 152–5
take-the-best heuristic 151, 152–5
and learning cue orders 159–60
and linear models 141–2
and memory-search costs 143
and opportunity 116, 120
classical decision-making 117
expansion of opportunity 119
interdependent decision-making 117–18
preference adaptation 119–20
restriction of opportunity 119
and rational choice 143
and recognition heuristic 145–9
and risk preferences 102
and satisficing 143
and social influence 475
and time preferences 102–3
and weighing and balancing 142
deference 560
and status 547–8, 549
delay legislation 65
democracy, and conflict management 595, 604
deviance, and differential association/influence 524–5
diffusion:
and cohesion 546
and conformity 86
and network dynamics 455, 461
cocktail-party problem 464–6
concurrency 458–9
connectivity 456
contact structure 467–8
cycles 460
distance 456
graph features controlling 455–6
linking evolution and diffusion 461–8
microlevel behavior rules 462–4
redundancy 456
relational scheduling 460–1
small-world effect 466–7
time-ordered path 457
timing effects 456–7
and structural equivalence 546
discrimination in employment 128–9
and allocative discrimination 131–3
dismissal 133
hiring 131–2
promotion 132–3
and ambiguous information 129–30
and availability of complainants 130
and implications 133–5
and information availability 129
and valuative discrimination 133
and within-job wage discrimination 130–1
dismissal, and discrimination in
employment 133
(p. 757) dispositions:
and emotions 51
and preferences 97
dissent, and mechanism-based explanation 697–8
dissonance reduction, and belief formation 87–9
belief tightness 88
centrality of beliefs 88–9
distributive social norms 651–2
and communication 652
and mutual identification 652–3
and social comparisons 653–5
and social context 652–3
divorce:
and belief-based mechanisms 346–7
and contact with divorcees 346–7
and contagiousness of 343, 348, 358
gender differences 356, 358–9
and coworkers as local demographic context 348–9
coworker variables 351–2
data and method 349–50
data shortcomings 359
effects of control variables 357
results of study 352–6
and demographic research on 343
and desire-based mechanisms 346
and endogenous processes 347–8, 359
and growth of interest in 342
and increase in 342
and inheritance of 343
and local demographic context 357–8
and marital-investment game 633–4
and marriage norms 346
and opportunity-based mechanisms 344–5
availability of spousal alternatives 345
friendship network 345
and social interaction, influence of 342–3
and trigger mechanisms 347
and work schedules 510
and workplace influences 348–9
dominance hierarchies, in animal groups:
and dominance relationships 568–9
and establishment of 568
and interaction-process model of 576–7
as action theory 576
animal abilities required for 579–80
assumptions of 576
characteristic processes 576–7
comparison with human models 585–6
configurations guaranteeing transitivity 578
conversion of intransitive relationships 578–9
data recording 580–1
experimental evidence 579–80
high rates of transitive relationships 577–8
location of actions 576
low rates of relationship reversal 577
micro-level interaction processes 582
random individual behavior 582
and linear structure of 569
jigsaw-puzzle model 572–4
prior-attributes hypothesis 569–71
rank changes 571–2
transitive dominance relationships 573
winner-loser-bystander models 574–5
and order rules 450–1
and reasons for studying 567–8
see also hierarchies
doubt, and belief formation 74
education, and self-fulfilling prophecies 297–8, 300, 301, 302–3
emotional stability, and personality 102
emotions:
and action:
direct impact of 57–8
emotional choice 54–7
formal preferences 62–7
substantive preferences 58–62
and affective trust 224
and anger 58, 60, 61
and beliefs 56, 67
biased beliefs 67
inadequate information 68
low-quality beliefs 68
and cognitive antecedents of 54–5
and contempt 59
and decay of 60–2
and dispositions 51, 64
and dissonance 87
and distinction from passions 52
and emotional choice 54–7
model of 56
and empathy gaps 62
and envy 59–60, 61
and fear 56–7, 58
and functions of 52
and guilt 58, 66
and hatred 61
and impatience 62, 63–4, 68
and indignation 58
and love 61, 65, 67, 68
and meanings of 51–2
(p. 758) not a natural kind 52
and occurrent events 51, 64
and perceptions 55
and preferences:
impact on formal preferences 62–7
impact on substantive preferences 58–62
preference reversal 58, 61
and proto-emotions 51
and punishment 58–60, 61–2, 66
and rational choice theory of action 52–4
and rationality 53
and risk attitudes 57, 62, 63–4
and triggering of 55
and urgency 62, 63–6, 68–9
and valence 63
and wishful thinking 67
envy 59–60, 61
epistemic authorities, and belief formation 75, 79, 83–4
equality:
and Marxism 123
and opportunity 136
affirmative action 121
equality of opportunity 120–1
equality of resources 121
motivation 123
outcome equality 121–2
responsibility 123
welfare equality 122
equation-based models, compared with agent-based computational modeling 255
multivariate linear models 256
ethnic conflict 599–600
and group-level dynamics 600
and nationalism 600
and polarization 601
and postcolonialism 600
ethnic segregation, see residential segregation
ethnography, see analytical ethnography
event-history-diffusion models, and
evolutionary game theory 633
evolutionary game theory 623–4
and difficulty in applying to sociology 634
and event-history-diffusion models 633
and evolutionarily stable strategy 169, 190 n1, 624
and evolutionary games 630–4
and observational learning 630–1
and social-interaction effects 631–3
evolutionary models, and agent-based models 249–51
evolutionary theory:
and collective action 401
and social norms 196
exchange relations, and status 555–6, 561
expectations, and self-fulfilling prophecies 309
expected utility theory 249
explanandum 28
and generality of theory 28
explanans 28
and isolated fields 28
explanation:
and actions 9, 96
and causal depth 8–9
and causal laws 41
and causal mechanisms 42
and counterfactual dependencies 41–2
and deductive arguments 44 n19
and explanandum 28
and explanans 28
and mechanism explanations 4–8
abstract mechanism schemes 7 core idea 5
definitions of mechanism 5, 6
difference from statistical approaches 6
selection mechanisms 7–8
semigeneral mechanisms 6–7
and micro-macro relationship 9–13, 32–3
complex models 14–16
macro-to-micro linkages 33–4
micro-to-macro linkages 35–7
and relations 9
and statistical associations 41
and structural individualism 8
definition of 8
and traditional philosophy view 4–5
extraversion, and personality 102
fairness, and game theoretic experiments 649
fairness norms 208–9
false beliefs, and self-fulfilling prophecies 296–7
explanation of 306–8
fulfillment of beliefs 308–10
family, and scheduling conflicts 509–10
fast-and-frugal heuristics 144–5
and environmental structure for 163
and group decision-making 158–9
and learning cue orders 160
and limitations of 161–2
and minimalist heuristic 150–5
and take-the-best heuristic 151–5
fear 56–7, 58
female foot-binding 626–7
(p. 759) female genital mutilation 626–7
financial bubbles, and self-fulfilling
prophecies 299, 307
Ponzi schemes 301, 304–5
first movers, and unconditional action 429
fixed threshold rule, and conditional decision-making 425
focal point matching, and conditional decision-making 425
framing, and categorization 75–6
Framington Heart Study 675
France, and constitutional conventions 210, 211, 213
free-riding:
and collective action 392, 397, 399
and not default position 399–400
friendship selection, and conditional
decision-making 436
functionalism, and Merton 26
game theoretic experiments 639, 659–60
and behavioral economics 639
and experimental design 642
anonymity 643
common knowledge 644–5
control group 645
empirical analysis 645
incentives 642–3
language 643–4
repetition 644
social context 643
and experimental tradition in sociology 639–40
and external validity 641
and field experiments 640
and laboratory experiments 640–1
and methodology 642
and new developments 660
aggregate outcomes 660
neuroscience 660
and reasons for running 640
and salience of distributive social norms 651–2
communication 652
mutual identification 652–3
social comparisons 653–5
social context 652–3
and social context 641
and social norms 641–2, 649
measuring reciprocity 649–51
and sustainability of norm-abiding behavior 655
punishment 657–9
reputation 655–6
selection 656–7
and theory 641
and trust 646
betrayal aversion 647
betrayal aversion and status 647–8
disentangling willingness to trust/take risks 646–7
institutional design 648–9
game theory:
and agent-based computational modeling 252
and applications in sociology:
behavioral game theory 628
deriving aggregate outcomes 620–1, 628–30
difficulties with 634
female foot-binding 626–7
female genital mutilation 626–7
gendered division of domestic labor 629–30
manufacturer-contractor interactions 628–9
status hierarchies 630
as tool to think with 620, 626–8
trust 627–8
and basic concepts of 621–4
assumptions 621–2
belief updating 623
characteristics of a game 621
focal point 622
multiple Nash equilibria 622
Nash equilibrium 622
norms 622
pooling equilibrium 623
semipooling equilibrium 623
separating equilibrium 623
signaling games 623
types 623
and behavioral game theory 626, 628, 633
aggregate outcomes 660
marital-investment game 633–4
neuroscience 660
and collective action 397–8
compared with agent-based computational modeling
behavioral assumptions 252–3
structural assumptions 253–5
and evolutionary game theory 623–4
difficulty in applying to sociology 634
event-history-diffusion models 633
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) 169, 190 n1, 624
evolutionary games 630–4
(p. 760) observational learning 630–1
social-interaction effects 631–3
and flexibility of 635
and importance of 635
and interdependent decision-making 117–18
and Nash equilibrium 254, 622
and potential value in sociology 620
and prisoner’s dilemma 622
constitutional conventions 211
cooperation 253, 397–8
tit-for-tat strategy 250
and public-goods game 400
and signaling theory 184, 623
trust 627–8
and social dilemma research 622
and sociologists’ lack of interest in 619–20
and ultimatum game 59–60
gender:
and division of domestic labor 629–30
and divorce 358–9
and scheduling conflicts in family 509–10
general-equilibrium models with price effects, and residential segregation 285
genetic algorithms 250
gossip, and social norms 203
grand theory 29, 43 n7
group solidarity, and interpersonal conflict 598–9
Guantanamo Bay 68
guilt 58, 66
Handicap Principle 180, 186
Harry Potter books 316, 320, 337 n1
hatred 61
heuristics:
and decision-making 144
adaptive decision maker 144
and fast-and-frugal heuristics 144–5
environmental structure 163
group decision-making 158–9
learning cue order 160
limitations of 161–2
minimalist heuristic 150–5
take-the-best heuristic 151–5
and group decision-making 155
heuristic methods 158–9
hidden profile task 156–8
recognition heuristic 155–6
and knowledge-based inference 149–50
minimalist heuristic 150–1, 152–5
take-the-best heuristic 151, 152–5
and learning cue orders 159–60
and recognition heuristic 145–9
hierarchies 583–4
and bystander effects 584
and comparison of human and
interaction-process models 585–6
and dynamic generation of 584
and examples of 566
and expectation states 583
and functions of 566
and Gould’s model 584–5
attachment patterns 584–5
as emergent phenomenon 584
as enacted phenomenon 584
game theory 630
and interpersonal conflict 598
and meaning of 566
and necessity for 566–7
and reproduction of 696
and scheduling conflicts 500, 515–16
and structure of 567
and ubiquity of 566
hiring, and discrimination in employment 131–2
historical sociology 712, 727–8
and analytic historical sociology
features of 723
imperial continuity and change 723–4
interstate boundaries 727
Ottoman empire 724–7
and analytical sociology 712
and comparative historical analysis 713–17, 723
cultural turn 715–16
macro-micro relationships 716–17
opposition to 716
origins and development 713–15
and cultural perspective 713
and culturalist approach 713
and explaining large-scale outcomes 712
and institutionalism 713, 715, 717–22
contingency 720–1
eviction of Jews 718–20
German vocational training 721–2
historical 717, 720
network analysis 722–7
path dependency 720–1
rational-choice 717
role of institutions 720
tax systems 717–18
and networks 713, 715, 722–7
history, and analogical reasoning 82
(p. 761) homophily, and meaning of 522
Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods Project 675
hysteresis 204
identity:
and preference formation 108–9
and social norms 199
imitation:
and belief formation 84
and self-fulfilling prophecies 84
immigration, and trust networks 233
impatience, and emotions 62, 63–4, 68
imperialism, and dissonance reduction 87
incentives, and game theoretic experiments 642–3
India, and Hindu-Muslim riots 595
indignation 58
inductive reasoning, and belief formation 77–80
conditional probability 78–9
logical invalidity 77–8, 79
inductively derived prophecy 296, 299, 306
industrial revolution, and changed conception of time 501–2
inequality:
and career opportunities:
opportunity hoarding 126–7
rigidity of opportunity structure 125–6
vacancy competition model 124–5
and discrimination in employment 128–9
allocative discrimination 131–3
ambiguous information 129–30
availability of complainants 130
implications 133–5
information availability 129
valuative discrimination 133
within-job wage discrimination 130–1
and human-capital model of 125
and opportunity 115, 120–3, 136
affirmative action 121
equality of opportunity 120–1
equality of resources 121
Marxist view 123
motivation 123
outcome equality 121–2
responsibility 123
welfare equality 122
and reproduction of 696
and surveys 670–1
inferences:
and analogical reasoning 80–3
criteria for 81
lessons of the past 81–2
overreliance 82
selection bias 82–3
and categorization 76
and group decision-making:
heuristic methods 158–9
hidden profile task 156–8
recognition heuristic 155–6
and inductive reasoning 77–80
conditional probability 78–9
logical invalidity 77–8, 79
and knowledge-based inference 149–50
minimalist heuristic 150–1, 152–5
take-the-best heuristic 151, 152–5
and learning cue orders 159–60
and recognition heuristic 145–9
influence networks 480–1
and cascade-seeding strategies 489–92
and generalized-affiliation networks 488–9
and Granovetter’s ‘all-to-all’ model 482–4
and random networks 484–7
and random-group networks 487–8
influentials, and conditional
decision-making 436–7
information:
and costs of gathering 54
and matching 367, 370–2
constraints 371
information asymmetry 371
networks 371–2, 375–6
screening 370
signaling 370–1
and rational choice 53
informed consent 300
innovation:
and influence-response function 479
and threshold models 479
and unconditional action 429
institutionalism, and historical sociology 713, 715, 717–22
contingency 720–1
eviction of Jews 718–20
German vocational training 721–2
historical institutionalism 717, 720
network analysis 722–7
path dependency 720–1
rational-choice institutionalism 717
role of institutions 720
tax systems 717–18
integrity, and trust 223
intentionality, and behavior 72, 94–5
(p. 762) interaction-process model of animal
hierarchies 576–7
as action theory 576
and animal abilities required for 579–80
and assumptions of 576
and characteristic processes 576–7
and comparison with human models 585–6
and configurations guaranteeing transitivity 578
and conversion of intransitive relationships 578–9
and date recording 580–1
and experimental evidence 579–80
and high rates of transitive relationships 577–8
and location of actions 576
and low rates of relationship reversal 577
and micro-level interaction processes 582
and random individual behavior 582
interdependency:
and decision-making 117–18
and relational trust 220
internalization, and belief and action conformity 85
interpersonal conflict 597–9
and civil war 607–8
and escalation into group violence 598, 599
and group solidarity 598–9
and hierarchies 598
and intimate nature of 598
interpersonal expectancy, and self-fulfilling prophecies 297–8, 300, 301, 302–3
interstate boundaries 727
investment banks:
and Matthew effect 553, 554
and status 556
investment bubble, and self-fulfilling
prophecies 299, 307
Ponzi schemes 301, 304–5
Iraq, and conflict in 592–3, 596
isolated fields, and explanans 28
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front, Sri Lanka) 593
Kuwait, and Iraqi occupation of 82
labor market:
and fairness norms 208–9
and residential segregation 289–90
labor market, and inequality in:
and discrimination in employment 128–9
allocative discrimination 131–3
ambiguous information 129–30
availability of complainants 130
implications 133–5
information availability 129
valuative discrimination 133
within-job wage discrimination 130–1
opportunity hoarding 126–7
rigidity of opportunity structure 125–6
vacancy competition model 124–5
law firms, and Matthew effect 553–4
learning:
and cue order in decision-making 159–60
and observational learning 318, 630–1
and reinforcement learning 250–1
and social learning 318
legal norms, and social norms 197–8
linear (mean)matching, and conditional decision-making 425, 426
linear models 141
and decision-making 141–2
and the mind 143
location choice, and segregation processes 277
love 61, 65, 67, 68
macro properties:
and definition of 9
and micro-macro relationship 9–13
complex models 14–16
Mafia 233
majority, and tyranny of 200–1
Marienthal project 667
markets, and Matthew effect 553–4
Markov models, and residential segregation 284–5
marriage:
and assortative mating 367
and interdependent behavior 273
and marital-investment game 633–4
and residential segregation 288–9
and two-sided matching 273–4
and work schedules 509–10
Marxism:
and equality 123
and self-fulfilling prophecies 299, 307
matching:
and assortative mating 367
and constraints on 366
and definition of 365
and distribution of characteristics in population 369–70
symmetry constraint 369–70
and economic exchange 367
and examples of 365–6
(p. 763) and feedback 385, 386
and formal models of 374–6
contract model 374–5
deferred-acceptance model 375
queueing model 374
and importance of 386
and information 367, 370–2
constraints 371
information asymmetry 371
networks 371–2, 375–6
screening 370
signaling 370–1
and institutions 366
and mechanisms of 365
and mutual acceptability 366–7, 386
and norms or rules of 372–4
centralized systems 372–3
decentralized systems 373–4
durability 374
and preferences 368–9, 385
reservation point 368
and segregation processes 276–7
and social networks and labour-market segregation 376, 385–6
employer preferences 377–8
full-information regime 380–1
information regimes 378–9
model overview 376–7
model results 380
network-information regimes 382–4
population structure 378
and stickiness of pairings 367
and temporal dynamics 385
Matthew effects 37, 38–9, 40
and status 551–5, 560
mechanism explanations 4–8
and abstract mechanism schemes 7
and causal depth 8–9
and causal mechanisms 42
and core idea 5
and definitions of mechanism 5, 6
and difference from statistical approaches 6
and micro-macro relationship 9–13, 32–3
complex models 14–16
macro-to-micro linkages 33–4
micro-to-macro linkages 35–7
and selection mechanisms 7–8
and semigeneral mechanisms 6–7
methodological individualism:
and agent-based computational modeling 249
backward-looking rationality 249–51
and core idea of 248
and differences from structural individualism 4
and models based on 249
and principles of:
action principle 248
bottom-up idea 248
and prior-attributes hypothesis 570
and unexpected results 248
micro-macro relationship 9–13, 32–3
and complex models 14–16
and macro-to-micro linkages 33–4
and micro-to-macro linkages 35–7
middle-range theories 25, 27–32
and characteristics of 30–1, 40
and definition of 27
and introduction of term 27
and level of generality of theories 29–30
and micro-macro relationship 32–3
macro-to-micro linkages 33–4
micro-to-macro linkages 35–7
and ordering of theories 28
and social dynamics 37–40
Matthew effects 38–9, 40
self-fulfilling prophecies 37–8, 39
and types of explanation:
causal laws 41
causal mechanisms 42
counterfactual dependencies 41–2
statistical associations 41
Middletown studies 667
mind, and linear models 143
mind-body problem 22 n8
mobility:
and social norms 206
and vacancy chains 9
Mona Lisa 336–7
moral norms, and social norms 196, 197
motivation:
and equality 123
and trust 223
music downloads, and social influence
experiment 315–16, 321–2
replication of 331
self-fulfilling prophecies 305, 332–6
and status 550
varying strength of social signal 322–4
individual behavior 324
inequality of success 324–6
role of appeal 328–31
unpredictability of success 326–8
mutual identification, and distributive social
norms 652–3
myopia 36–7
(p. 764) Nairobi, and reciprocity 650–1
Nash equilibrium 254, 622
nationalism, and ethnic conflict 600
neoclassical economics, and self-fulfilling
prophecies 307–8, 309–10
Netherlands, and constitutional conventions 210
network autocorrelation:
and balance 523
and child-rearing case study 526–7
and data on 537–8
and definition of 522
and differential association/influence 523–5
conformity 524
deviance 524–5
and foci of activity 527–9
characteristics of 530
conditional nature within 529
context 529
diversity of groups 528–9
heterogeneity in 535–6
homogeneity 536
impact on common behavior 530
individuals’ choice of 536–7
limited segmentation 530–1
and groups 528
and homophily 522, 523
and interactions with other people 523
and levels of consistency 538–9
and protection against social influence 527–8
and selective attachment 525–6
and transitivity 523
and triplexity of social structure 532–3
analysis of 539–42
hypothetical illustration of 533–4
network dynamics 448, 468–9
and diffusion 455, 461
concurrency 458–9
connectivity 456
contact structure 467–8
cycles 460
distance 456
graph features controlling 455–6
redundancy 456
relational scheduling 460–1
time-ordered path 457
timing effects 456–7
and linking evolution and diffusion 461
cocktail-party problem 464–6
microlevel behavior rules 462–4
and models for network change 448
crystallizing models 452–3
dominance hierarchies 450–1
edge-based models 450–4, 455
node-based models 449, 454–5
order rules 450–1
pattern rules 450, 451–2
social balance 451–2
ties 451
transitions 453
and segmentation 538
networks:
and collective action 405–6
and conditional decision-making 434–5
and game theory 253–4
and historical sociology 713, 715, 722–7
and influence networks 480–1
and matching 371–2, 375–6
and sexual networks 14–16
and static conception of 447–8
and trust 221
neuroscience 660
new structuralism 545–6
Niceae, First Council of 511
norms:
and anti-achievement norm 204–5
and internalization of 107
Norway, and constitutional conventions 210, 211
observational learning 318, 630–1
observations, and belief formation 74–5
occupations, and sex segregation 273
see also labor market
Oedipus effect 294
openness to experience, and personality 102
opportunity 33
and choice 115, 116, 120, 136
classical decision-making 117
expansion of opportunity 119
interdependent decision-making 117–18
preference adaptation 119–20
restriction of opportunity 119
and civil rights 115
and discrimination in employment 128–9
allocative discrimination 131–3
ambiguous information 129–30
availability of complainants 130
implications 133–5
information availability 129
valuative discrimination 133
within-job wage discrimination 130–1
and inequality in career opportunities 124
opportunity hoarding 126–7
rigidity of opportunity structure 125–6
vacancy competition model 124–5
(p. 765) and social inequality 115–16, 120–3, 136
affirmative action 121
equality of opportunity 120–1
equality of resources 121
Marxist view 123
motivation 123
outcome equality 121–2
responsibility 123
welfare equality 122
opportunity structure 33
order, and Hobbesian problem of 245–6
organ donation, and matching 372–3
organizational behavior:
and organizational citizenship behaviors 227
and preferences 104–5
ostracism 59
and social norms 200–2
Ottoman empire 723–7
paradigm shifts 89
parents, and preference formation 108
participant observation, and ethnography 690
partner choice 678
and sexual networks 14–16
Pascal’s wager 80, 391
patent citations 557
path dependency, and historical sociology 720–1
peer influences 259–61
perceptions, and emotions 55
performance evaluations, and status 550–1
personality:
and behavioral genetics 107
and five-factor model of (FFM) 101–2
and preferences 100–3
larger social processes 103
risk preferences 102
time preferences 102–3
philosophy, and explanation of phenomena 4–5
placebo response, and self-fulfilling
prophecies 298–9, 300–1, 302
response expectancy 308
pluralistic ignorance:
and belief formation 84, 86–7
and communication 86–7
and racial segregation 86
and totalitarian regimes 86
pogroms, and violent conflict 595
Poland, and queueing norms 206–7
polarization:
and conflict 593, 600–2
as consequence of conflict 606
political norms 209–13
and constitutional conventions 209–13
political parties, and conflict 603–4
politics, and conflict 595, 601
Ponzi schemes, and self-fulfilling prophecies 301, 304–5, 307
postcolonialism, and ethnic conflict 600
power relations:
and scheduling conflicts 515–16
and trust 223, 225
precommitment, and opportunity restriction 119
preferences 95–6
and action 95, 96–7
and changes in 107–8
association models 107–8
goals 109
human nature 109
internal processes 109–10
manipulation 110
and emotions:
impact on formal preferences 62–7
impact on substantive preferences 58–62
and formation of 108–9
identity 108–9
parents 108
and immutability of 106–7
and matching 368–9, 385
reservation point 368
and nature of 96–100
behavioral tendencies 97
counterfactual situations 97–8
default expectations 98
dispositions 97
not mental states 98
physical causes 97
simplifying role 98–9
and opportunities, interaction with 119–20
and personality 100–3
five-factor model of 101–2
larger social processes 103
risk preferences 102
time preferences 102–3
and possessors of 103–6
collective subjects 103, 104
natural persons 103, 105, 106
organizations 104–5
and preference falsification 86
and preference reversal 58, 61
and rational choice 53, 95
and social significance of 108
and tastes 100, 101, 102, 107
and utilitarianism 100–1
and utility 101
and variations in 100
(p. 766) prisoners’ dilemma 622
and constitutional conventions 211
and cooperation 253, 397–8
and tit-for-tat strategy 250
professional associations 127
professions, and opportunity hoarding 127
promotion, and discrimination in employment 132–3
prospect theory 59
public-goods game 400
punishment:
and game theoretic experiments 657–9
and role of emotions 58–60, 61–2, 66
quasi-moral norms 196
queueing, and segregation processes 276
queueing norms 206–7
racism, and dissonance reduction 87
rational choice theory 101
and action 52–4
and analytical sociology 22 n1
and decision-making 143
and organizational behavior 104–5
and preferences 95
rationality, and emotions 53
reactive conflict, and self-fulfilling prophecies 298, 306, 308–9
reality, and categorization 75
reciprocity:
and collective action 400
and measurement of 649–51
recognition heuristic 145–9
and group decision-making 155–6
reference groups 34
relational contracting 226
relations, and explanation of phenomena 9
relative deprivation 34
reliability, and trust 223
religion, and time segregation 511–12
reputation, and game theoretic
experiments 655–6
reservation point, and matching 368
residential segregation:
and behavioral models 282
and marriage 288–9
and measurement of 278–9
and models linking individual and neighborhood data 282–3
agent-based models 286–7
general-equilibrium models with price effects 285
Markov models 284–5
and multiple processes 287
overlapping social locations 287–8
race and income 287
and processes generating 277–8
and residential choice model 279–81
choice not to move 281
housing supply 281–2
individual experience 281
price effects 281
response to neighborhood change 281
and school segregation 289
and shortcomings of studies on 278
and workplace segregation 289–90
resource-mobilization theory, and collective action 393
resources egalitarianism 121
response expectancy, and self-fulfilling prophecies 308, 309
responsibility, and equality 123
revealed preference theory 97
revenge, and social norms 202–3, 214
rioting:
and conditional decision-making 433–4, 482, 484
and violent conflict 595
risk:
and emotions 62, 63–4
and familiarity with 57
and trust 219, 646
risk preferences, and decision-making 102
romantic networks 14–16
rules:
and behavior 94
and conditional decision-making:
conditional-decision rules 425–8
fixed-decision rules 431–2
Russia:
and barter economy 230
and trust 230
satisficing 36, 143
and status 558–9
scheduling conflicts:
as barriers to social relations 499
and congruence 500
and coordination problems 498
analysis of 504–6
approaches to solution of 507–8
and the family 509–10
and maintenance of group boundaries 511
as obstacle to social interaction 512
and organizational coordination 512–16
congruent schedules 513
fairness 514–15
(p. 767) hierarchical structures 500, 515–16
parallel integrated structures 513–14
symmetrical scheduling problems 514
and organizational impact 500
and religion 511–12
and scheduling constraints 500
and segregation effects 499–500, 510–12
and unrealized/abandoned social relations 508–10
and voluntary groups 508–9
see also time
school segregation, and residential
segregation 289
science, and Matthew effect 552–3
screening, and matching 370
segregation:
and analytical units in research on 274–5
multiple 274–5
scale 274, 275
time 274
and choice limitation 270
and context of 271
and definition of 270
and dimensions of 271
of groups across social locations 271–2
and individual actors 270, 272
and markets 275
and models of processes of 276
location choice 277
matching 276–7
queueing 276
vacancy chains 276
and multiple actors 270
and organizational structures 275
and pluralistic ignorance 86
and processes leading to 269
as property of social organization 269
and scheduling conflicts 499–500, 510–12
and segregation model 12–13, 94
and self-reinforcing nature of 269–70
and social interactions and segregation processes 272–4
feedback models 273
interdependent behavior 272–3
and social networks and labour-market segregation 376, 385–6
employer preferences 377–8
full-information regime 380–1
information regimes 378–9
model overview 376–7
model results 380
network-information regimes 382–4
population structure 378
selection, and game theoretic experiments 656–7
selection bias, and analogical reasoning 82–3
selection mechanisms 7–8
selective attachment, and network autocorrelation 525–6
self-binding, and opportunity restriction 119
self-fulfilling prophecies 37–8, 39
and analysis of 310–11
and bank runs 294, 297, 299, 306
and beliefs 294–5
and concept of 295–9
causal sequence 295–6, 297
criteria for 295–6
false beliefs 296–7
misapprehension of causal sequence 297
and definition of 294, 311
and evidence for 301–5
bank runs 303–4
interpersonal expectancy in education 302–3
music downloads 305
placebos 302
Ponzi schemes 304–5
and examples of 297–9
and explanations of 305–6
false beliefs 306–8
fulfillment of false beliefs 308–10
and feedback 297, 299
and imitation 84
and inductively derived prophecy 296, 299, 306
and interpersonal expectancy 297–8, 300, 301, 302–3
and investment bubble 299, 307
Ponzi schemes 301, 304–5
and methods of identifying 299
experimental method 299–301
manipulation of beliefs 299
natural experiments 301
statistical analysis 301
and music download experiment 305, 332–6
and placebo response 298–9, 300–1, 302
response expectancy 308
and reactive conflict 298, 306, 308–9
and self-fulfilling theory 299, 307–8, 309–10
and suicidal prophecy 295
self-interest, and social norms 214–15
self-organized behavior, and agent models of 246
semiconductor industry 557
(p. 768) semigeneral mechanisms 6–7
September 11 terrorist attacks, and emotional reactions to 57, 61, 66–7, 68
sexual abuse scandals 79
sexual networks 14–16
shame, and social norms 196, 201–2
shareholder value 309
SIENA (simulation investigation for empirical-network analysis) program 260, 261, 265 n4
signaling theory (ST) 168, 169–70
and applications of 183–5
animal behavior 183–4
anthropology 185
game theory 184, 623
microeconomics 184
political science 184–5
sociology 185
and background knowledge 182
and basic principles of 172–4
Mucius-Porsen example 174–5
and Challenger disaster 704
and communication 168
and conspicuous consumption 186–90
and contamination of signals 173–4
and corporate malfeasance 703
and costless signals for honest signalers 181–2
and countersignaling 184
and differential benefits 177–8
and differential costs 175–7
and equilibrium 173
and integration of analytical ethnography/sociology 703–6
and interests:
conflicting 173
(mis)alignment of 172
and intimate relationships 703–4
and limitations of 182
receiver’s demands 183
social norms and conventions 183
and matching 370–1
and misrepresentation 172
and misunderstanding 172
and origins and development of 168–9
Bourdieu 188
Mauss 188
Posner 188–9
problem of waste 186–90
testing of 189–90
Veblen 186–8
and signals 170
and signal-sign transformation 171
and signs 170
and sign-signal transformation 170–1
and situations covered by 172–3
and social norms 201
and sources of signal cost 178
context 182
exposure to risk 179–80
multiple sources 181
receiver-dependent cost 180
third parties 180
wasted resources 178–9
and status dynamics 705
and trust 627–8, 705
Silicon Valley 229
situational determinism 33, 34
social action, and explanation of 72
social balance, and network dynamics 451–2
social capital 219
social cleavages, and conditional decision-making 435–6
social comparisons, and distributive social norms 653–5
social dynamics 37–40
and Matthew effects 38–9, 40
and self-fulfilling prophecies 37–8, 39
social influence:
and belief formation 83–7
in black-box (uncertain) situations 83–4
conformity 84–6
epistemic authorities 83–4
imitation 84
pluralistic ignorance 84, 86–7
and binary-choice models 478, 480
and collective action 405, 406, 476–7
and conformity 476
and crowd behavior 476
and cultural markets 315, 317
cumulative advantage 319–20
experimental approach 320–2
influence on choice 318–19
Mona Lisa 336–7
and decision-making 475
and divorce:
belief-based mechanisms 346–7
desire-based mechanism 346
opportunity-based mechanisms 344–5
trigger mechanisms 347
workplace 348–9
and evolutionary game theory 631–3
and group-based networks:
cascade-seeding strategies 489–92
generalized-affiliation networks 488–9
random-group networks 487–8
and influence networks 480–1
(p. 769) and influence-response function 479–80, 481
and information cascade models 478
and music download experiment 321–2
individual behavior 324
inequality of success 324–6
replication of 331
role of appeal 328–31
self-fulfilling prophecies 305, 332–6
unpredictability of success 326–8
varying strength of social signal 322–31
and music downloads 315–16
and network effects 477
and resistance to in conditional decision-making 429
fixed actions 432
fixed-decision rules 431–2
memory 432
partial resistance 430–1
threshold models 432–3
unconditional actors 429–30
and social change 476
and threshold models 477–81
collective action 481–2
Granovetter’s ‘all-to-all’ models 482–4
random networks 484–7
resistance to influence 432–3
social interaction:
and conditional decision-making 433
friendship selection 436
group size 433–4
local-network structure 434–5
social cleavages 435–6
social location of influentials 436–7
and evolutionary game theory 631–3
and homophily 522
and network autocorrelation 522
and similarity 521–2
social interdependency, and vacancy chains 9
social learning 318
and cue order in decision-making 160
and information cascade models 478
social liberalism, and modeling of 256–61
social movements, and collective action 393
social networks:
and influence networks 480–1
and network dynamics 452–3
and small-world effects 466–7
social networks, and labour-market
segregation 376, 385–6
and full information regime 380–1
and model overview 376–7
employer preferences 377–8
information regimes 378–9
population structure 378
and model results 380
and network-information regimes 382–4
social norms 195
and consequentialist motivations 214
and conventions 198
and definition of 196
and divorce 346
and equilibria in repeated games 198
and evolutionary explanation 196, 401
and fairness norms 208–9
and game theoretic experiments 641–2, 649
and identity 199
and legal norms 197–8
and mobility 206
and moral norms 196, 197
and observation by others 196
and observing others 196
and operation of 199–203
anticipation 200
avoidance 199–200
contempt 199, 200, 201
costs 202
gossip 203
revenge 202–3
sanctions 199
second-order avoidance 200–1
shame 199, 201–2
signaling theory 201
social rejection 200–2
and pointless suffering 195–6
and political norms 209–13
constitutional conventions 209–13
and presocial emotions 214
and quasi-moral norms 196
and queueing norms 206–7
and salience of distributive 651–2
communication 652
mutual identification 652–3
social comparisons 653–5
social context 652–3
and self-interest 214–15
and social usefulness of 195
and strangers 206
and sustainability of norm-abiding behavior 655
punishment 657–9
reputation 655–6
selection 656–7
and tipping norms 205–6
and violation of, shame 196
and work norms 203–5
social order, and Hobbesian problem of 245–6
(p. 770) social proof, and belief formation 84
social relations, and scheduling conflicts 498–9, 508–10
social structure:
and choice 33–4
and triplexity of 532–3
analysis of 539–42
hypothetical illustration of 533–4
social trust 231
Soviet Union, and pluralistic ignorance 86
Sri Lanka, and JVP insurgency 593
statistical associations, and explanation 41
statistical modeling, and multivariate linear models 256
status:
and betrayal aversion 647–8
and changeability of 545
and determinants of differences in 555
and exchange relations 555–6, 561
and experience of quality 558–60, 561
commensuration 558, 559–60
satisficing 558–9
value orientations 558–9
and inferences about quality 545
and Matthew effect 551–5, 560
and rewards 545
and scheduling conflicts 515
as signal of quality 545, 546, 547–51, 554–5, 557
in bureaucracies 550
deference 547–8, 549, 560
in gangs 549–50
meaning of quality 549
music download experiment 550
nominal distinctions 549
performance evaluations 550–1
social-structural position 549–50
underlying quality 551
and status dynamics 705
and status position of associates 555, 561
and transfer of 555–6
and uncertainty 556–7
status hierarchies 38
status-attainment theory 108
stochastic actor-oriented models 260–1
strategic alliances, and trust 228
strategic interaction, and interdependent decision-making 117–18
structural individualism 4, 8
and causal depth 8–9
and definition of 8
and differences from methodological individualism 4
as methodological position 8
and structuralism 26
structuralism:
and Merton 26
and structural individualism 26
structure:
as guide to action 546
and new structuralism 545–6
suicidal prophecy 295
suicide 65
suicide bombers, and urgency 65
sunk-cost fallacy 51
supervenience, and micro-macro relationship 10–12
surveys:
and aggregation problems 671–3
and analytical sociology 668, 673, 682–3
and capturing relevant concepts 669
and causal inference 679–82
and combining with qualitative approaches 677–8
and contextual data 675
and counterfactual questions 671
and defining what is to be measured 670
and design of 673, 674
gendered division of domestic labor 672
virginity pledges 672–3
and enriching data 676, 677–9
and experiments within 678–9
and increased data availability 666
and interaction-based explanation 673
and language change 669
and longitudinal data 673–4
and multilevel design 675
and networks 674–5, 676
global network data 676
and origins of sample surveys 667
and random sampling techniques 667
and reification of concepts 670
and representativeness 667
and respondent-driven sampling 674–5
and respondents’ answers 677
and sample size 675–6
and sampling design 667
and social facts 668–9, 670
income inequality 670–1
social inequality 670
and social mechanisms 671, 682
and standardization 676
and subjective understandings of respondents 676–7
and untapped data 679
and uses of survey data 667–8
(p. 771) and validity 677
and variable-centered sociology 666
and weakness of data 677
and widespread use of 666
symbolic capital 188, 189
tastes:
and personality 102
and preferences 100, 101, 107
technology, and network effects 477
terrorists, and urgency 65
textile industry, and manufacturer-contractor interactions 628–9
theory, and self-fulfilling prophecies 299, 307–8, 309–10
thick description 30
thin description 30
Thomas Theorem 37
threshold models, and social influence 477–81
and cascade-seeding strategies 489–92
and collective action 481–2
and generalized-affiliation networks 488–9
and Granovetter’s ‘all-to-all’ model 482–4
and random networks 484–7
and random-group networks 487–8
and resistance to influence 432–3
time:
and cultural differences in conception of 501
and the family 502
and historical changes in conception of 501–2
and individual use of 502
and network diffusion 456–7
in the social sciences 501–3
and space-time cube 503
and space-time geography 503
and time-budget perspective 502–3
time preferences, and decision-making 102–3
tipping norms 205–6
tools, and transformation into theory 140–1
totalitarian regimes, and pluralistic ignorance 86
tragedy of the commons, and collective action 392
transitional economies, and trust 230
trigger mechanisms, and divorce 347
trust:
and affective trust 224
and alternatives to 233–5
and cognitive trust 223–4
and cooperation 219
and decline in individual trust 231
and definition of 646
and encapsulated interest conception of 220, 224
and future research on 236
and game theoretic experiments 646
betrayal aversion 647
betrayal aversion and status 647–8
disentangling willingness to trust/take risks 646–7
institutional design 648–9
and game theory 627–8
and macro-level social effects 231–2
and negative consequences of 219, 232–3, 235–6
corruption 232–3
immigration 233
Mafia 233
and organizations 227–30
attitudinal effects 227
barter economies 230
business networks 229
cooperation 228
interorganizational relations 228–30
moderating effects in 228
negotiations 228
organizational citizenship behaviors 227
personal networks 230
reduced efficiency 229
risk 228
transitional economies 230
and reasons for interest in 218
as relational phenomena 219
and relational trust 220
definition of 220
mutual interdependence 220
network of social relations 221
relationship between actors 220–1
third-party effects 221–2
and risk 219, 646
and signaling theory 627–8, 705
in social relations 225–6
commitment 225
negative effect of controls/contracts 226
physician-patient relationship 225
and social trust 231
and strangers 232
and thick trust 219–20
and thin trust 219
and trustworthiness:
competence 223
indicators of 222
integrity 223
(p. 772) motivation 223
power relations 223, 225
reliability 223
trusting behavior 227
and types of exchange 224, 226
and uncertainty 218, 219
and violation of 220
tulipmania 304
ultimatum game 59–60
unanticipated consequences 35–7
uncertainty:
and belief formation 83–4
and observational learning 631
and status 556–7
and trust 218, 219
unemployment, and work norms 203–4
United Kingdom, and constitutional
conventions 209–10
United States, and constitutional
conventions 210, 211, 212–13
urgency:
and emotions 62, 63–6, 68–9
and low-quality beliefs 68
utilitarianism, and preferences 100–1
utility, and preferences 101
vacancy chains 9, 276
valuative discrimination, and employment 133
voluntary groups, and scheduling conflicts 508–9
wage rates:
and fairness norms 208–9
and work norms 204
wants:
and action 95
and behavior 95
war, and violent conflict 595
waste, as sign of wealth 186–90
wealth, and waste as sign of 186–90
welfare egalitarianism 122
wine industry 554
wishful thinking 36, 67, 80
women:
and discrimination in employment 128, 130
allocative discrimination 131–3
implications 133–5
valuative discrimination 133
within-job wage discrimination 130–1
and gendered division of domestic labor 629–30
work norms 203–5
working hours, and family scheduling conflicts 509–10
workplace segregation, and residential segregation 289–90
Yamashita v Styer (US Supreme Court, 1946) 66
Yugoslavia 602