Abstract and Keywords
In the United States, federal courts have been extraordinarily important in constraining and monitoring the development of the modern regulatory state. The existing literature helps one to understand why delegation accompanied by judicial review takes place and how the interests of political, bureaucratic, and judicial actors interact with institutional structures. This article explores law and regulation from the contrasting viewpoints of public policy analysis and rational choice political economy. It begins with an introduction to the economic case for regulation of economic activity and moves next to research on the political economy of regulatory policy. The article then discusses the regulatory process in the United States, along with public participation in other legal systems and how a background norm of cost/benefit analysis could be used by courts as a way to evaluate the quality of regulatory decision making. Finally, it considers rule making in a democracy, focusing on technocracy and public accountability.
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