- The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science General Editor: Robert E. Goodin
- About the Contributors
- The Study of Law and Politics
- Judicial Behavior
- Strategic Judicial Decision-making
- Historical Institutionalism and the Study of Law
- The Rule of Law and Courts in Democratizing Regimes
- The Global Spread of Constitutional Review
- Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence
- The Judicialization of Politics
- Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary
- Legal and Extralegal Emergencies
- International Law and International Relations
- The European Court and Legal Integration: An Exceptional Story or Harbinger of the Future?
- War Crimes Tribunals
- The Globalization of the Law
- Civil Law and Common Law: Toward Convergence?
- Constitutional Law and American Politics
- The Legal Structure of Democracy
- Administrative Law
- Legislation and Statutory Interpretation
- Informalism as a Form of Legal Ordering
- Natural Law
- Rights in Legal and Political Philosophy
- Formalism: Legal, Constitutional, Judicial
- Feminist Theory and the Law
- The Racial Subject in Legal Theory
- Filling the Bench
- The U.S. Supreme Court
- Relations among Courts
- Litigation and Legal Mobilization
- Legal Profession
- Judicial Independence
- Law and Regulation
- Law as an Instrument of Social Reform
- Criminal Justice and the Police
- Law and Political Ideologies
- Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions
- Understanding Regime Change: Public Opinion, Legitimacy, and Legal Consciousness
- Law and Society
- The Analysis of Courts in the Economic Analysis of Law
- Psychology and the Law
- Law and History
- The Path of the Law in Political Science: De-centering Legality from Olden Times to the Day before Yesterday
- Reflections about Judicial Politics
- Law and Politics: The Problem of Boundaries
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
In his incomparable style, Judge Richard Posner describes what is perhaps the issue of most interest to scholars in the strategic tradition to judicial decision-making: under which conditions do judges behave more like “legislators” or more like “judges?” Posner's description of the role of judges suggests that judges' behavior can be modeled in the same fashion in which we model other rational actors—politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. The strategic approach seeks to sort out the various competing interests faced by judges when making decisions. In essence, the strategic approach explores the role of politics in judicial decision making. This article reviews the strategic approach to judicial decision making in the United States and compares it with the attitudinal approach. It also discusses the so-called internal strategic approach, which focuses on the decision-making process within the U.S. Supreme Court.
Pablo T. Spiller is Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professor of Business and Technology and Professor of Business and Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley.
Rafael Gely is Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law at the University of Cinncinati.
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