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date: 06 July 2022

Abstract and Keywords

A large literature reviews the effects of constitutional arrangements and electoral rules on various aspects of QoG. The state of the debate, so far, is not one that provides straightforward answers regarding the important institutions, the magnitude of the effects, or even their direction. Through a meta-analysis of the relevant literature, we seek in this chapter to evaluate the relationship between electoral rules and corruption. The results of the meta-analysis suggest support for an individual accountability mechanism that transcends the crude majoritarian–proportional distinction. We show that absence of corruption can be positively correlated with systems in which district magnitude is at its lowest (plurality systems) and its highest (proportional systems). The important electoral system features appear to be those that cultivate a “personal vote,” strengthening accountability between voters and individual legislators.

Keywords: corruption, electoral system, meta-analysis, accountability, electoral rules

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