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date: 06 July 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter reviews the rapidly expanding literature on the electoral effects of corruption. A general finding is that corrupt parties and politicians get punished by voters at elections, but oftentimes not harshly enough to remove them from office. This chapter firstly elaborates how the electoral accountability mechanism is ideally supposed to work. It then looks at the extent to which corrupt elected representatives get punished and how different types of studies seem to systematically reach different conclusions in this respect. Thereafter, the by now quite substantial body of research on the reasons why corruption voting takes place is discussed, after which the much more limited literature on the connection between electoral accountability and levels of corruption is reviewed. The chapter ends with some ideas of how to move forward within this field of research.

Keywords: corruption, corruption voting, electoral accountability, retrospective voting, incumbency voting, responsiveness

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