Abstract and Keywords
This chapter analyzes the dysfunctions of Nigeria’s oil sector, often framed as the “resource curse.” The resource curse thesis has for long been employed to explain the developmental challenges of veteran oil and mineral exporters such as Nigeria. This chapter examines the weaknesses of the resource curse thesis especially its commodity determinism, and argues for a political economy approach for a more encompassing understanding of the political constraints to reforming Nigeria’s oil sector. Using a political settlements framework, the chapter argues that the horizontal elite, vertical societal, and external constraints on successive ruling elites generate suboptimal policy choices for the oil industry. These political constraints generate competitive, distributional, and fiscal pressures from key stakeholders on Nigeria’s ruling elite towards these suboptimal policy choices. The analysis here covers the twenty-first century, from 1999, when Nigeria transitioned to electoral democracy.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.