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date: 18 September 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The primary aim of this article is to explain the concept of human beings as embodied subjects, which has been proposed as a better alternative view of mind–brain relations than the main traditional views, Cartesian dualism and mechanistic materialism. Whereas the traditional views see “mind” as the name of a substance, the “embodiment” view treats human beings as unities, whose mental activities are influenced by bodily functioning, and vice versa. The concept was developed mainly by some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, most notably by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article ends with some examples of clinical applications of the concept in relation to the treatment of three types of mental disorder.

Keywords: embodied subjects, mind–brain relations, dualism, materialism, human beings as unities, Merleau-Ponty

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