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date: 29 February 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This introduction provides an overview of the five chapters in this section, which explores some of the central issues in psychoanalysis as it relates to phenomenology and science. One such issue concerns the scientific status of psychoanalysis (natural or social? bona fide or tendentious?), and more specifically which between the methods of psychoanalysis and its real-life practice may be considered scientific. One of the chapters examines psychoanalysis as a scientific theory of mind, arguing that psychoanalysis fails to test its theories. Another chapter suggests that many of the central tenets of psychoanalytic theory are evidentially supported by recent developments in empirical neuropsychology. Also discussed are the debate between those who view psychoanalysis as science and those who insist that it rather offers a hermeneutic, how psychoanalysis provides a phenomenology in its articulations of unconscious life, and alternative phenomenological schemes for framing the dynamic unconscious.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, phenomenology, science, scientific theory of mind, empirical neuropsychology, unconscious, psychoanalytic theory

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