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date: 21 August 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Game theory can help guide our thinking about the future of international relations in three ways. Static models can help us understand the effects of varying exogenous parameters, like the cost of war, the level of transparency, or the returns from trade. Dynamic models help us understand how fears or hopes for the future can affect present behavior, and how present behavior constrains or enables future options. Finally, evolutionary game theoretic models can represent processes that unfold over longer time horizons, helping us understand the rise of international cooperation and the decline of war. Given that we have no data on the future, formal theory is especially useful in guiding our speculation.

Keywords: game theory, war, conflict, cooperation, beliefs, information, preventive war, arms races, proliferation, evolutionary game theory

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