- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
The temporal aspects of experience raise three related questions, central to our understanding of temporal consciousness: how do sensory experiences carry information about, or make us aware of, some of the temporal features of perceived events (if at all)—in what format, by what mechanisms?; do the temporal properties of conscious experiences—including the arrangement of their temporal parts—play any role in how these experiences present or represent the temporal properties of perceived events?; how does such temporal representation manifest itself in the phenomenology of the relevant experiences? Most theories of temporal consciousness can be divided in terms of how they treat these questions. This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the main theories currently on the market and some of their background assumptions; it then moves to a—also brief—critical review of some of the arguments at the centre of the dispute.
Philippe Chuard is associate professor of philosophy at SMU in Dallas (Texas). He has published articles in the philosophy of perception (nonconceptual content, phenomenal sorites) and in epistemology. His current research is on the nature of temporal experience, working on a book entitled The Temporal Mind: A Philosophical Introduction, as well as another book defending the snapshot conception of temporal experiences.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.