- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 1980s. Much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, the chapter considers its nature, covering questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences, about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience.
Myrto Mylopoulos is assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Institute of Cognitive Science at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. Her research interests include the phenomenology of agency, action control, skill, consciousness, and self-control.
Joshua Shepherd is assistant professor in the Philosophy Department at Carleton University. He is also a research professor at the University of Barcelona, where he is the principal investigator on the project Rethinking Conscious Agency. In the past he has been a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and a junior research fellow at Jesus College, Oxford.
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