- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
When developing accounts of imaginative experience, philosophers generally (though not universally) accept two pieces of phenomenological data as a starting point: (1) the experiential character of imagining is importantly similar to that of perceiving; (2) despite this similarity, the experiential character of imagining is nonetheless importantly different from perceiving. Someone who aims to explain imaginative experience must discharge two principal tasks: explain the similarity between the experiential character of imagination and the experiential character of perception, and explain the difference. The main focus of this chapter is the second of these tasks. Three views that aim to explain how the character of imaginative experience differs from the experiential character of related mental states like perception are considered. Close examination reveals that none gives an adequate account of the character of imaginative experience. The final section briefly explores what their failure teaches us about the project of giving an account of imaginative experience.
Amy Kind is Russell K. Pitzer Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. Her research interests lie broadly in the philosophy of mind, but most of her work centers on issues relating to imagination and to phenomenal consciousness. In addition to authoring the introductory textbook Persons and Personal Identity (Polity 2015), she has edited The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination (Routledge 2016) and Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries (Routledge 2018), and she has co-edited Knowledge through Imagination (Oxford 2016).
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