- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
Consciousness is one of the most elusive phenomena of the natural world. But it is, after all, part of the natural world. It has presumably evolved at some point, as a result of certain natural processes taking place within the causally integrated spatiotemporal system we call Nature. What need is there, then, for a philosophy of consciousness? As a natural phenomenon, should it not submit to theoretical explanation by the natural sciences? What do philosophers have to contribute here? The assumption behind the present volume is that philosophy may have a more significant role to play in shaping our understanding of consciousness; that even a complete science of consciousness may involve certain lacunae calling for philosophical supplementation. The plausibility of this notion depends in part on what one calls ‘a science.’ To bracket verbal issues, we will concern ourselves here with three areas in which the science of consciousness as pursued today leaves certain questions unaddressed. The Introduction’s three sections introduce and discuss these three areas; each serves as a motivating introduction to one of the volume’s three parts.
Uriah Kriegel is the author of many articles on consciousness, as well as four books: Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (Oxford 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (Oxford 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (Oxford 2015), and Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (Oxford 2018).
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