- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
The question of whether consciousness is embodied has been vitiated by a failure to ask a more basic, and possibly obvious, question: what is the body? This chapter argues that the body you see in the mirror, the hands that you hold up in front of you, are instances of the body as object. But the body is more than the body as object. There is also the body as subject; the body as lived. You cannot see the lived body by looking in the mirror. The body as lived is that in virtue of which you see the body as object (and many other things also, of course). There is no question concerning whether consciousness is embodied in the lived body. Consciousness is the lived body; they are one and the same thing; the body as object has no trace of consciousness in it.
Mark Rowlands (D.Phil., Oxford University) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. He is the author of nineteen books, translated into more than twenty languages, and over a hundred journal articles, book chapters, and reviews, which incorporate interests in the philosophy of mind, ethics, moral psychology, and phenomenology.
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