- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter considers three connections between consciousness and issues in ethics: first, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status; second, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action; and third, the relevance of consciousness for the acquisition of moral knowledge. This is a disparate set of connections, prompting a question: is there anything about consciousness these connections have in common? One might expect the answer to be no. But debate in each area has thus far failed to settle just what about consciousness is so intuitively important for moral status, moral responsibility, and moral knowledge. Given this fact, it remains possible that there is some common connection of these different issues in ethics to consciousness. The chapter takes up this possibility in its conclusion.
Joshua Shepherd is assistant professor in the Philosophy Department at Carleton University. He is also a research professor at the University of Barcelona, where he is the principal investigator on the project Rethinking Conscious Agency. In the past he has been a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and a junior research fellow at Jesus College, Oxford.
Neil Levy is professor of philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, and a senior researcher at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. He is the author of seven books, including, most recently, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford 2014).
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