- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter is concerned with relationships between three forms of consciousness and three types of memory. The three forms of consciousness are introspective consciousnessaccess consciousnessand phenomenal consciousness.There are three types of memory that are arguably connected, either directly or indirectly, with one or more of the aforementioned forms of consciousness—long-term memory, working memory, and iconic memory. The chapter will consider the relationship between each type of consciousness and each type of memory.
Christopher S. Hill is William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. Hill has written numerous articles and four books: Sensations (Cambridge), Thought and World (Cambridge), Consciousness (Cambridge), and Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (Oxford). He has also edited several collections, most recently joining with Brian McLaughlin to edit New Essays in the Philosophy of Perception (Philosophical Topics, Volume 44, Issue 2).
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