- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
Levine (1998, 2001) argues that though the conceivability of zombies manifests the existence of an explanatory gap between the physical and the mental, there was good reason to adopt materialism. On the other hand, Levine (2014) voices doubt about the viability of materialism in the face of the explanatory gap. The inference to the rejection of materialism takes the form of an inference to the best explanation; the best explanation of the existence and persistence of the explanatory gap is that there is a genuine metaphysical gap. This chapter will outline the principal argument that the rejection of materialism follows rather directly from the conceivability of zombies and explain why that argument is unacceptable. A related argument against materialism will be considered and rejected before considering an argument that some materialists have presented, that the explanatory gap is not really such a problem for materialists after all. The chapter will try to explain why the inference to the best explanation still holds in the face of this argument.
Joseph Levine is professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He received his PhD from Harvard in 1981 and has taught at N.C. State University and the Ohio State University. He works in philosophy of mind, with a focus on the problem of consciousness. He published Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness in 2001, and in 2018 a collection of his papers entitled Quality and Content: Essays on Representation, Consciousness, and Modality.
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