- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.
Frank Jackson is an emeritus professor at The Australian National University. His books include Conditionals, From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Language, Names, and Information.
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