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date: 13 June 2021

Abstract and Keywords

Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.

Keywords: Physicalism, a priori entailment, physical properties, conceptual analysis, necessary a posteriori, combination problem

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