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date: 13 June 2021

Abstract and Keywords

Russellian monism is a quite general approach to the problem of consciousness, which comes in a variety of forms depending on what is said about the categorical properties of basic physical entities. We can usefully distinguish between panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms. Panpsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are experiential properties. Panprotopsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are proto-experiential, where proto-experiential properties are not themselves experiential properties but are crucial ingredients in facts that explain the production of consciousness. The first half of this chapter will discuss panpsychist forms of Russellian monism, the second half will discuss panprotopsychist forms.

Keywords: Russellian monism, panpsychism, panprotopsychism, categorical properties, consciousness, physicalism, combination problem, panqualityism

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