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date: 20 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the different ways in which market actors are “co-opted” as corporate law regulators. It considers the preconditions for generating “endogenous self-regulation” through the lens of the formation and operation of the UK Takeover Code and Panel. From endogenous self-regulation, the chapter moves onto consider “market-controlled” regulation where the state directly co-opts market actors as regulators. The chapter shows that the regulatory biases generated by self-regulation are more multi-faceted than, and often inconsistent with, the standard account that self-regulation is likely to generate rules that favour the regulated.

Keywords: corporate law, self-regulation, endogenous self-regulation, contracting zone, market-controlled regulation, UK Takeover Code, UK Takeover Panel, comply or explain approach, state, market

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