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date: 01 December 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter is about two kinds of lies, knowledge lies and group lies, which are considered to be interestingly different from typical lies. Typically, lies are told by an individual, and they are intended to convince their addressee of a false claim. By contrast, in telling a knowledge lie, the liar does not intend to deceive the addressee into believing a false claim. Instead, the liar intends to prevent the addressees from knowing, but not necessarily from believing, some true claim. Group lies are lies that are told by a group, such as a company, a government, or your knitting circle. Group lies are unlike typical lies, because they are not straightforwardly related to lies told by individuals who are members of the lying group. For each type of lie, I give a more rigorous characterization, then discuss why this kind of lie deserves special philosophical attention, and lastly provide some critical discussion of the accounts of each type of lie that have been proposed in the philosophical literature.

Keywords: group lies, knowledge lies, lying, deception, knowledge, group attitudes

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