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date: 27 February 2020

(p. ix) List of Illustrations

(p. ix) List of Illustrations

  1. 1.1 Size of selected megaprojects, measured against GDP of selected countries 3

  2. 2.1 When to choose trial-and-error-learning or selectionism 31

  3. 3.1 S-curve of innovation adoption 41

  4. 3.2 Number and type of Major League baseball stadiums constructed, 1860–2010 44

  5. 3.3 Global development of super-tall skyscrapers 46

  6. 3.4 Boom and bust: opening of new nuclear reactors worldwide 50

  7. 4.1 A map of fragility 65

  8. 4.2 Graphing “investment fragility” 68

  9. 4.3 Sample distribution of 245 large dams across five continents (1934–2007) 72

  10. 4.4 Density trace of actual/estimated cost (costs overruns) in constant local currency terms 73

  11. 4.5 Density trace of schedule slippage with the median and mean 74

  12. 4.6 Location of large dams in the sample and cost overruns by geography 79

  13. 4.7 An aspiration to investment robustness in the Guavio hydroelectric project 81

  14. 4.8 Cumulative fragility: erosion near the foundation of Kariba Dam wall 83

  15. 4.9 Inaccuracy of cost estimates (local currencies and constant prices) for large dams over time (1934–2007) 84

  16. 5.1 Involvement level of key actors in SR91X at critical events over the course of development 109

  17. 8.1 Box plots of cost risk and benefit risk 1920–2011 179

  18. 10.1 Project shaping 222

  19. 10.2 Shaping as a sequence of options 227

  20. 10.3 An megaproject value tradespace with many possible design options 228

  21. 12.1 Stylized representation of different infrastructure design structures 266

  22. 12.2 Excerpts of the design structure matrices and companion organizational matrices for the London Olympic Park and HS2 cases 268

  23. 12.3 Sustaining highly fragile consensus-oriented developments 273

  24. 14.1 Balancing routines and innovation in megaprojects 322 (p. x)

  25. 14.2 Balanced response to uncertainty 322

  26. 16.1 The European PPP market by value and number of projects since 2005 366

  27. 18.1 The Norwegian quality-at-entry regime for major public investment projects 408

  28. 18.2 Stochastic cost estimation: definition of key terms 417

  29. 18.3 Deviation between the final cost and the cost frame approved by Parliament 418

  30. 18.4 Number of projects with cost overruns and savings by sector 419

  31. 18.5 Deviations between the final cost and the approved cost frame at the time of commissioning for the project 420

  32. 18.6 Deviation between the final cost and the agreed steering frame for the project 421

  33. 20.1 The Diamond of Innovation model 461

  34. 20.2 The Dreamliner’s Diamond of Innovation 464

  35. 21.1 London 2012 Olympics: Program, projects, and systems 484

  36. 25.1 Construction of dams by decade during the twentieth century 562

  37. 25.2 Change in monthly downstream flows owing to Aswan High Dam 564

  38. 25.3 Financial flows in dam building 566