- Copyright Page
- List of Figures and Table
- List of Contributors
- Global Justice and the Role of the State: A Critical Survey
- Equality of Opportunity and Global Justice
- Global Justice and Global Citizenship
- On the Core of Distributive Egalitarianism: Towards a Two-Level Account
- The Holders of Human Rights: The Bright Side of Human Rights?
- Motivating Solidarity with Distant Others: Empathic Politics, Responsibility, and the Problem of Global Justice
- Just Global Health: Integrating Human Rights and Common Goods
- Transforming Global Justice Theorizing: Indigenous Philosophies
- The Link between Subsistence and Human Rights
- Capabilities, Freedom, and Severe Poverty
- Aiding the Poor in Present and Future Generations: Some Reflections on a Simple Model
- Climate Change Ethics and the Problem of End-State Solutions
- Distant Strangers and the Illusion of Separation: Climate, Development, and Disaster
- The Human Right to Democracy and the Pursuit of Global Justice
- Thomas Pogge’s Conception of Taking the Global Institutional Order as the Object of Justice Assessments
- What Second-Best Scenarios Reveal about Ideals of Global Justice
- Global Gender Justice
- International Law
- Political Legitimacy And Territorial Rights
- Settlement and the Right to Exclude
- A Critical Theory of Transnational (In-)Justice: Realistic in the Right Way
- Personal Responsibility and Global Injustice
- Thinking Normatively about Global Justice without Systematic Reflection on Global Capitalism: The Paradigmatic Case of Rawls
- The Right to Resist Global Injustice
Abstract and Keywords
On what is called the “institutional approach” to justice, the primary duty that justice agents have in cases where just institutional arrangements are lacking is that of doing their part to help establish these arrangements. This special institutional focus in the context of institutional injustice can appear misdirected and insufficiently demanding. It is misdirected, according to some critics, because it wrongly fixates on means (i.e. institutional mechanisms) rather than ends (i.e. just outcomes); and it seems overly lax because it limits duties of justice to creating better institutions. With global injustice as its setting, this chapter tries to assuage these concerns.
Kok-Chor Tan is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania.
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