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date: 22 October 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article analyzes informational issues that emerge in a contest model of conflict, a model in which the outcome of open conflict depends on the relative military capabilities of the adversaries using a traditional Bayesian game-theoretic approach. It provides an introduction to the topic along with insights into how conflict can emerge in settings with informational asymmetries. The article deals with issues of asymmetric information about players' utility from winning; their costs of producing effort; abilities; and what private information about aggressive potential implies for the probability of outbreak of outright conflict instead of peaceful settlement.

Keywords: conflict model, Bayesian theory, informational asymmetries, game theory

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