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date: 25 May 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This article discusses the thesis that human intelligence in evolutionary history led from the need to meet the needs of social interactions. The evolution of human coordination capacities was not simply a single ascent up one complexity gradient. Social intelligence hypotheses are intended as accounts of the early coevolution of sociality and intelligence that facilitated team reasoning in small family bands. A major application of global game theory has been to speculative crises in financial markets. Self-construction decreases the loss of private information in imitation cascades. Primates and other social animals are equipped by basic and nonmysterious biological devices and behavioral dispositions to coordinate, at least in the statistical sense relevant to the selection of mixed strategies without backward induction. But capacities for easy coordination are potential barriers to specialization of labor and to efficient exploitation of private information.

Keywords: human intelligence, evolutionary history, social interactions, social intelligence, sociality, global game theory

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