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date: 15 December 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article deals mainly with disagreements that are internal to the evolutionary program. It introduces some theoretical concepts from the theory of games and evolutionary biology, focusing in particular on dilemmas of cooperation. The coordination and bargaining games are covered. The evolutionary approaches based on evolutionarily stable strategies, kin selection, assortativity, and reciprocity have dominated the theoretical literature for the last three decades. The Nash bargaining solution can be very unjust in asymmetric games, so evolutionary game theory loses some of its appeal in these contexts. Bargaining appears to reflect the balance of power and seems to be affected by local norms of fairness. Strong reciprocity theorists have argued that reciprocal motives are robust enough to be represented as social preferences governing individual behavior across a variety of decision tasks. Strong reciprocity models indicate that cooperation may survive even when some of these constraints are relaxed.

Keywords: evolutionary program, cooperation, theory of games, evolutionary biology, bargaining games, Nash bargaining solution, strong reciprocity, coordination

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