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date: 25 January 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This article reports the perspective on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics, based on the idiosyncratic readings of the philosophical literature and, more importantly, the experiences doing applied statistics in the social sciences and elsewhere. It is noted that Bayes need not be linked with subjectivity and inductive reasoning. Bayesian statistics is connected with a formal inductive approach. A problem with the inductive philosophy of Bayesian statistics is that it assumes that the true model is one of the possibilities being considered. The Bayesian data analysis fits well into the falsificationist approach. Because it is felt that the status quo perception of Bayesian philosophy is wrong, it is thought that it is more helpful to present the author's perspective forcefully, with the understanding that this is only part of the larger philosophical picture.

Keywords: inductive philosophy, Bayesian statistics, Bayes, formal inductive approach, social sciences, falsificationist approach

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