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date: 05 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article analyzes empirically the relevance of direct measures for incentive problems in German venture capital (VC) financial contracting, and investigates whether differences in experience or ownership structure across firms remain relevant even for given realizations of direct measures of incentive problems. It also asks whether risk perception in itself depends on experience and/or ownership structure. The article is organized as follows. It presents the database and describes the relative frequencies of several contractual terms in Germany and the role of debt financing as a determinant of the utilization of different covenants. It introduces independent variables and then analyzes how experience and ownership structure of a VC firm influence its utilization of contractual terms and its perception of incentive problems.

Keywords: incentive problems, German venture capital firms, financial contracting, ownership structure, risk perception, debt financing

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