- Consulting Editors
- Introduction: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly
- The Modern Capitalist World Economy: A Historical Overview
- Legal Institutions and Economic Development
- Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions
- The Four Types of Capitalism, Innovation, and Economic Growth
- The Dynamics of Capitalism
- The Role of Finance in Economic Development: Benefits, Risks, and Politics
- Property Rights and Capitalism
- Management and Governance of the Business Enterprise: Agency, Contracting, and Capabilities Perspectives
- Capitalism as A Mixed Economic System
- Monopoly Capitalism
- Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism
- Executive Compensation: Governance and the Financial Crisis
- Bubbles in Asset Prices
- Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
- Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the Enduring Tension between “Lumpers” and “Splitters”
- The East Asian (mostly Japanese) model of Capitalism
- Refounding Capitalism
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article focuses on the general problems confronting parties designing a contractual relationship. Contracts concern the future, which is both uncertain and influenced by the behavior of the parties. This presents the parties with a number of problems, the solutions for which are imperfect. Contract doctrine can facilitate their efforts, but it can also be an impediment. Contract design and contract law are discussed.
Victor P. Goldberg is Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law at Columbia Law School. His areas of research are law and economics, antitrust, regulation, and contracts.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.