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date: 25 August 2019

(p. 495) Index

(p. 495) Index

abortion
as causing death of fetus, 409–412
equality and, 428–429
as harmful to fetus, 416–419
harm-wrong gap in, 424–428
“Abortion and Infanticide” (Tooley), 61–62
achievementism, 323–324
additive separation, 230–232
afterlife
belief in, 167
eternal recurrence and, 167
agency, immortality and, 355–378
alive
context and, 9
as contrary to dead, 13
cryptobiosis and, 15–17
“dies” and, 11
as intrinsic, 13
scope of concept, 9–10
Alston, Bill, 151n57
amoeba. See fission
anhydrobiosis, 15
animalism, personality and, 76n14
animals
dead, as corpses, 87–88
desire for continued existence in, 468–470
desire in, 468
identity, 89–90
killing of, 393
as self-conscious, 467–468
suffering of, 467
utilitarianism and, 467
well-being in, 466
annihilationism, 83–95
anticipation
of death, 307–310
Epicureanism and, 309
negative, 307
positive, 307
Apology (Plato), 186, 187–190
Aquinas, 133, 146n8, 149n36, 195
Aristotle, 81, 194–199
asexual reproduction. See fission
atemporalism, 266–270
atomism, 206
authority, deference to, 118–119
Bailey, Andrew, 151n57
Baker, Lynne Rudder, 143
Becquerel, Paul, 15
being alive. See alive
being dead. See dead
beliefs
“I” and, 121–122
in life after death, 167
Belshaw, Christopher, 17
Benardete, José, 148n26
Bentham, Jeremy, 238, 467, 478, 479
bias, future, 245–247
biological continuer, 117–118, 122
biological criteria of identity, 111–113
biological view of existence, 2
biological view of personality, 61, 62–66
biologicalness, of personality
in biological view, 65
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 69
Blackmun, Harry, 409–411
body. See also corpse survivalism
in Termination Thesis, 7–8
Boethius, 67
borders, immortality and, 343–344
boredom, immortality and, 363
Boswell, James, 234
boundaries, 115–116
Bourget, David, 77n21
brain function, 132
Broad, C. D., 246
Broome, John, 314n5
Burley, Mikel, 348
Capek, Karl, 175, 340, 355–357
categorical desire, 274–275, 360
Cessation Thesis (CT)
cryptobiosis and, 14–31
of dying, 5–7
problems with, 14–31
Chalmers, David, 77n21
change of location, death as, 189
China, one-child policy in, 219
Christianity, eternal recurrence and, 168
(p. 496) Clegg, James S., 15, 16, 18
closed time, 170–171, 182n11
complete life, 198–199
compound dualism, 133
concurrentism
corpse, 88
Epicureanism and, 261
conditional desire, 274–275, 360
conformist preferentialism, 331
constancy, of first-person reference, 124
constant-length additive separation, 231–232
context, “I” and, 146n6
contradictories, alive and dead as not, 13, 17
contraries, alive and dead as, 13
conventionality, of personality
in biological view, 64
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 68
convergence, 291–292
Corcoran, Kevin, 141, 143
corpse
concurrentism, 88
creationism, 88–89
dead animal as, 87–88
in Termination Thesis, 7–8
corpse survivalism
animal identity and, 89–90
dead-animal argument and, 87
eliminativism and, 93–95
essentialism and, 85–86
existence as, 80–95
four-dimensionalism and, 82
in person/body argument, 84–85
pluralism and, 82, 93–95
psychological-continuity argument and, 86
count noun, death as, 14
counting, 115–116
creationism, corpse, 88–89
cryptobiosis
Cessation Thesis and, 14–31
defined, 15
dormancy vs., 15
incapacitation and, 28–31
permanence and, 18–19
cyclical, time as, 167–168
Davies, Paul, 176
Davydov, Pavel, 146n6, 147n24, 151n57
De anima (Aristotle), 194–195
dead
as contrary to alive, 13
cryptobiosis and, 15–17
as intrinsic, 13
“is dead,” 12–13
dead-animal argument, 87
death
as count noun, 14
philosophy of (See philosophy of death)
as singular term, 14
time and, 160–163
time of, 40–44
death penalty
moral rights theory and, 481–483
retributivism and, 477–481
utilitarianism and, 483–488
deference, 118–123
DeGrazia, David, 416–417, 418, 420–422
demonstration, “I” and, 120–121
deprivation approach, 257, 268
deprivations, neglected, 240–241
Derstine, Janelle, 151n57
desire
in animals, 468
in Bradley’s view, 284–289
categorical, 274–275, 360
conditional, 274–275, 360
convergence and, 291–292
degrees of, 282–284
“for,” 289–291
future-directed categorical, 278–279
immortality and, 360
overview of, 274–275
persons and, 282–284
preferentialism and, 326
“that,” 289–291
Desire View, 278–279
dicephaly, 414–415
dies
“alive” and, 11
at instants, 11–12, 45n3
in intervals, 11–12
time and, 11–12
Difference Making Principle (DMP), 287
distribution, 228–230
division. See fission
DMP. See Difference Making Principle (DMP)
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), 434–436
Doomsday (Leslie), 243
dormancy, cryptobiosis vs., 15
dreamless sleep, death as, 188–189
dualism
Aquinas and, 146n8
brain function and, 132
compound, 133
defined, 105
identity and, 105
materialism and, 105
resurrection and, 137
simple, 131–132
soul and, 131–132
without temporal parts, 131–133
dying. See also dies
Cessation Thesis of, 5–7
“is dying,” 12
philosophy as practice for, 193
Termination Thesis of, 7–9
(p. 497) effectivism, 327, 328, 329, 331
Eliade, Mircea, 168
eliminativism, corpse and, 93–95
emotions
fear of death and, 297–298
relevance of, 298–302
ending, need for, 375–376
Englehardt, H. Tristam, 71
Epicureanism
anticipation and, 309
argument of, 255–256
atemporalism and, 266–270
“bad” and, 299–301
concurrentism and, 261
criticisms of, 242
eternalism and, 258–260
fear and, 302–303
fear of death and, 200, 205–206
happiness and, 202
harm of death in, 220–221
loss in death and, 218–219
no-subject argument and, 236
pleasure and, 204
priorism and, 261–264
subsequentism and, 264–266
Termination Thesis and, 257
Epicurus, 201, 204, 205–208, 215, 218–223, 236, 242, 255, 299
epistemology, 250, 337
Equal Wrongness of Killing Thesis, 392–396
equality
abortion and, 428–429
just war theory and, 441–444
Erdos, Paul, 237
essentialism
corpse and, 85–86
person, 86
eternal recurrence
attitudes toward, 176–178
closed time and, 170–171
defined, 167
identity and, 175–176
justice and, 179–180
linear time and, 169–170
lives not worth living and, 180–181
meaningfulness and, 178
movement in time and, 173–175
in Nietzsche, 168, 177
objectivity and, 172–173
perspective and, 172–173
religion and, 168
subjectivity and, 172–173
suffering and, 180–181
time and, 167–168
eternalism
defined, 7
Epicureanism and, 258–260
existence and, 10t
Termination Thesis and, 9
time and, 7
eudaimonia, 196–197
euthanasia, death as, 202
exclusive hedonism, 323
existence
biological view of, 2
as corpse, 80–95
death as, 13
eternalism and, 7, 10t
as inherently valuable, 367–368
prenatal, 310–312
presentism and, 7, 10t
psychological view of, 2
Termination Thesis and, 8
facts
metaphysics and, 156–157
ordinary, 157, 162
presentism and, 162
underlying, 157, 162
Falling Elevator Model, 134, 140–143, 151n52
fatalistic symmetry, 239
fear
defined, 302
Epicureanism and, 302–303
fear of death
anticipation and, 307–310
Epicureans and, 200, 205–206
nonexistence and, 304
premature death and, 305–307
rationality and, 297–298, 302–305
Feinberg, Joel, 71
Feit, Neil, 259
Feldman, Fred, 17, 31, 33, 161, 258, 259, 260
fetus
abortion as causing death of, 409–412
death of, as harm to, 416–419
a person’s existence as, 412–416
fission, 1
as biologically normal division, 36–37
as division into living organisms, 34
as division into living things, 32–33
as division into living things without downgrading, 34–35
as division into newly living things, 37–40
incapacitation and, 31
as internally caused division, 37
problem of, 31
teleological approach to, 36–37
“for,” desire and, 289–291
“four-dimensionalism,” 82, 164n4
four-dimensionalism, 158
Frowe, Helen, 460n38–39
future bias, 245–247
future-directed categorical desire, 278–279
Gage, Phineas, 244
gain, immortality and, 362–363
(p. 498) Gendler, Tamar, 151n57
generative division, 39. See also fission
Glover, Jonathan, 485
goodness of lives, 227–232
gradual replacement, 135, 143–144
Grey, William, 259
Grünbaum, Adolf, 172
Gulliver’s Travels (Swift), 338
happiness
in Aristotle, 196–197
in Epicurus, 202
harm
death as, 218–219
to fetus in abortion, 416–419
preferentialism and, 324–326
proactive, 321–322
retroactive, 322–332
severity of, seriousness of wrong and, 400–405
Harris, John, 67
Hartshorne, Charles, 336
Hasker, William, 132, 141
hedonism
exclusive, 323
priorism and, 261
retroactive harm and, 323
hegemony, of personal time, 247–253
Hensel, Abigail, 414
Hensel, Brittany, 414
“here,” 120
Hershenov, David, 51n35, 139, 141, 151n57, 266
historic-dependence account, of identity, 90–93
history, eternal recurrence and, 167
Homo sapiens, 62–63
Homo sapiens idaltu, 62–63
Homo sapiens sapiens, 62–63
hopelessness, irreversibility and, 21–22
Hudson, Hud, 141, 143
human beings, as persons, 62–63
humanity, of personality
in biological view, 65
in moral view, 74
in psychological view, 69
Hume, David, 234, 241, 250
Hurka, Thomas, 453
hybrids, 63
“I”
beliefs and, 121–122
context sensitivity of, 146n6
deference to authority and, 118–119
demonstration and, 120–121
intended constancy of, 124
as not deferential, 119–123
person-directed attitudes and, 122
Proteanism and, 114–115
referent of, 114–116
semantics of, 103–105
identity, 1–2
animal, 89–90
biological criteria of, 111–113
criteria of, 97–99, 108–114
dualism and, 105
eternal recurrence and, 175–176
historic-dependence account of, 90–93
immortality and, 341–342
life account of, 89
materialism and, 105, 150n48
persistence and, 109
psychological criteria of, 109–111
schematic criterion of, 108–109
semantics of, 103–105
stoicism and, 175
survival and, 146n4
temporal parts and, 102–108
immortality
actual, 337
agency and, 355–378
appeal of, 367–376
in Aristotle, 195–196
attractiveness of, 350–353
borders and, 343–344
boredom and, 363
challenges to appeal of, 338–340
content and, 343–344
desire and, 360
epistemology and, 337
gain and, 362–363
identity and, 341–342
as impossible, 195–196
infinity and, 348–350
kinds of, 337–338
lives as narratives and, 347–348
loss and, 363–367
necessary, 337
need for ending and, 375–376
overview of, 337
personal relationships and, 346
problems of, 359–367
pseudo-, 250–251
recognizability and, 339, 343–350
unattractiveness of, 340
value of being and, 367–368
veiled, 250–251
impossibility
irreversibility and, 19–20
of postmortem revitalization, 23–26
technological, irreversibility and, 26–28
incapacitation
cryptobiosis and, 28–31
fission and, 31
indexical, 114–116
infinity, 238–239, 348–350
injury, 398–399
instants, 11–12, 13, 45n3
Intended Constancy of First-Person Reference, 124
(p. 499) intermittent presence, 26, 50n33, 52n51, 53n52
internalism, priorism and, 262
intervals, 11–12
intrinsic, 13
intrinsicality
of being alive, 13
of being dead, 13
of personality
in biological view, 63
in moral view, 72
in psychological view, 68
irreversibility
chemical changes and, 52n48
clarification of, 21–22
hopelessness and, 21–22
impossibility and, 19–20
internal grounded impossibility and, 20–21
permanence and, 18–19
technological impossibility, 26–28
Jacobs, Jonathan, 141
Janacek, Leos, 340
Johansson, Jens, 150n45
Johnson, Samuel, 234
Johnston, Mark, 99, 113, 122, 123, 129, 137, 151n52
Judaism, eternal recurrence and, 168
jus in bello, 432–433
just ad bellum, 432–433
just war theory
alternatives to, 436–457
Doctrine of Double Effect and, 434–436
killing and, 430–436
justice, eternal recurrence and, 179–180
Kamm, Frances, 314n10
Kant, Immanuel, 71, 81, 477, 478
Kaplan, David, 104, 115, 120
Kaufman, Frederick, 243, 336, 341
Keilin, David, 15, 16, 18, 50n29
Keller, Simon, 324
killing
of animals, 393
Equal Wrongness of Killing Thesis and, 392–396
just war theory and, 430–436
knocking unconscious vs., 396–398
of noncombatants, 444–450
personhood and, 393
respect and, 393–394
rights and, 398–400
well-being and, 398–400
King, Peter, 252
knocking unconscious, killing vs., 396–398
Kripke, Saul, 243
Lamont, Julian, 259
“later than,” 170–171
Le Poidevin, Robin, 174, 175
Leiter, Brian, 1
Leslie, John, 101, 243
Lewis, David, 248, 249
life account, of identity, 89
life after death
belief in, 167
eternal recurrence and, 167
Life View, 278–279
linear time, 169–170
Lippert-Rasmusen, Kasper, 396–397, 407n16–17
lives worth living, 180–181
living, in present, 222–223
location, change of, death as, 189
Locke, John, 67, 98, 108–109, 481
loss
death as, 218–222, 223–227
immortality and, 363–367
Lucas, J. R., 172
Lucretius, 200, 202, 206, 213, 234, 236, 237, 242, 310–312
Luper, Steven, 259, 266
Luther, Martin, 480
Makropulos Case, The (Capek), 340, 355–357
Markosian, Ned, 6
Marquis, Don, 472
Marx, Karl, 369
materialism
Falling Elevator Model and, 134
identity and, 150n48
resurrection and, 135–140
survival and, 102–108, 134–135
without temporal parts, 134–145, 149n42
May, Todd, 338, 350–351
meaningfulness, eternal recurrence and, 178
Merricks, Trenton, 134, 140, 143
metaphysics
contribution of, 155–156
facts and, 156–157
reality and, 156
tasks of, 156
of temporal parts, 115–116
of time, 158–160
workings of, 156–157
“method of cases,” 113
modality, time and, 158
Moller, Dan, 246
momentary parts, 106
mondegreen, 235–236
Moore, Adrian, 238
moral theory of personality, 61–62, 70–75
movement, in time, 173–175
Myth of the Eternal Return, The (Eliade), 168
Nagel, Thomas, 172, 180, 183n17, 208, 238, 242, 266, 277, 384n76, 436, 450
narratives, lives as, 347–348
(p. 500) natural kind, personality as not determining, 64–65
negative anticipation, 307
neglected deprivations, 240–241
Newton-Smith, W. H., 170
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 168, 177, 183n16
nonbeing, as fearful, 304
noncombatants
collateral harm to, 450–457
killing of, 444–450
no-subject argument, 236–239
“now,” 119–120
Nozick, Robert, 243, 481
Nussbaum, Martha, 345
objectivity, eternal recurrence and, 172–173
O’Connor, Tim, 141
Olson, Eric, 76n14, 102, 112, 113, 141, 151n57
Once-for-All Determination of Persistence Conditions, 123–124
one-child policy, in China, 219
others, deference to, 118–119
Parfit, Derek, 146n4, 155, 240, 245, 246–247
permanence
cryptobiosis and, 18–19
irreversibility and, 18–19
persistence
identity and, 109
of personality
in biological view, 64
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 69
Proteanism and, 128–130
psychological-continuity argument and, 86
persistence conditions, 123–124
person, defined, 102
person essentialism, 86
personal identity, 1–2
animal, 89–90
biological criteria of, 111–113
criteria of, 97–99, 108–114
dualism and, 105
eternal recurrence and, 175–176
historic-dependence account of, 90–93
immortality and, 341–342
life account of, 89
materialism and, 105, 150n48
persistence and, 109
psychological criteria of, 109–111
schematic criterion of, 108–109
semantics of, 103–105
stoicism and, 175
survival and, 146n4
temporal parts and, 102–108
personal time, hegemony of, 247–253
personality
biological theories of, 61, 62–66
biologicalness of
in biological view, 65
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 69
conventionality of
in biological view, 64
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 68
defined, 67
human beings and, 62–63
humanity of
in biological view, 65
in moral view, 74
in psychological view, 69
intrinsicality of
in biological view, 63
in moral view, 72
in psychological view, 68
in Locke, 67
as matter of degree
in biological view, 63
in moral view, 72
in psychological view, 68
moral theories of, 61–62, 70–75
natural kinds and, 64–65, 73
nature and theories of, 61–62
persistence of
in biological view, 64
in moral view, 73
in psychological view, 69
psychological view of, 61, 66–70
psychologicalness of, 65
specieshood and, 62–64
Termination Thesis and, 61, 66, 70, 74
vitality of
in biological view, 65–66
in moral view, 74
person/body argument, 84–85
person-directed attitudes, 122
personhood
of corpse, 82
defined, 75n2
essentialism and, 85–86
existence and, 60–61
killing and, 393
overview of, 60–61
perspective, eternal recurrence and, 172–173
Persson, Ingmar, 17
Pettigrove, Glen, 244
Phaedo (Plato), 190–194
Philodemus, 203
Philosophical Gourmet Report (Leiter), 1
philosophy, as practice in dying, 193
philosophy of death
as “intersubdisciplinary,” 1
as specialty, 1
Plato, 81, 186–194
(p. 501) pleasure, 204
Pliny the Elder, 250
pluralism, corpse and, 82, 93–95
Pollock, John, 76n16
Popper, Karl, 149n34
positive anticipation, 307
postmortem revitalization, 23–26
premature death, 305–307
prenatal existence, 310–312
present, living in, 222–223
presentism
defined, 7
existence and, 10t
facts and, 162
reality and, 159–160, 162
Termination Thesis and, 9
time and, 7
Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH), 451
priorism
defined, 261
Epicureanism and, 261–264
hedonism and, 261
internalism and, 262
well-being and, 263
proactive harm, 321–322
Proteanism
defined, 99
“I” and, 114–115
persistence and, 128–130
survival and, 127–130
temporal parts and, 114–130
psychological continuer, 117–118
psychological criteria of identity, 109–111
psychological view of existence, 2
psychological view of personality, 61, 66–70
psychological-continuity argument, corpse and, 86
psychologicalness, of personality
in biological view, 65
in moral view, 73–74
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 103, 104
Quinton, Anthony, 251–252
Rachels, James, 405n1
rationality, of fear of death, 297–298, 302–305
Rawls, John, 238
Rea, Michael, 143
reality
metaphysics of, 156
presentism and, 159–160, 162
time and, 158–159
reassembly, resurrection and, 135–140
recognizability, 343–350
referent, 114–116
Regan, Tom, 472–473
Regarding Henry (film), 244
relationships, immortality and, 346
relativity, 182n9
relevance, of emotions, 298–302
religion, eternal recurrence and, 168
remains. See also corpse survivalism
in Termination Thesis, 7–8
replacement, gradual, 135, 143–144
reproduction. See fission
respect, killing and, 393–394
restoration, 23
resurrection, reassembly and, 135–140
retributivism, 477–481
retroactive harm, 322–332
retroactive wrongs, 332–334
Rettler, Bradley, 151n57
revitalization, 23–26
rights, killing and, 398–400
Roe v. Wade, 409–410
Rorty, Richard, 71
Rosenberg, Jay, 31, 33
Russell, Bertrand, 179
Russell, Jeff, 151n57
schematic criteria of identity, 108–109
Schofield, Malcolm, 239
semantic ascent, 103–105
semantics, of “I,” 103–105
Seneca, 239
Shoemaker, Sydney, 109, 125, 248
Sider, Ted, 151n57
Silverstein, Harry S., 161, 266
simple dualism, 131–132
simple preferentialism, 325–326
Singer, Peter, 67, 467–468
singular term, death as, 14
sleep, death as dreamless, 188–189
Smart, J. J. C., 174
Smith, John Maynard, 50n33
Smith, Nicholas, 350
Socrates, 186–194
soul
in Aristotle, 194–195
brain function and, 132
dualism and, 131–132
non-human living things and, 47n14
in philosophical vs. nonphilosophical thought, 2
separation, 194–195
Special Composition Question, 6
specieshood, 62–64
Stoicism, identity and, 175
strategic preferentialism, 325, 327
subjectivism, 329
subjectivity
eternal recurrence and, 172–173
time and, 174
subsequentism, 264–266
(p. 502) suicide
in Aristotle, 196
in Plato, 192
Sunstein, Cass R., 489
survival
dualism and, 102–108
gradual replacement and, 135
identity and, 146n4
materialism and, 102–108, 134–135
Proteanism and, 127–130
temporal parts and, 102–108
suspended animation, 1
Swift, Jonathan, 338
Swinburne, Richard, 149n34
symmetry
fatalistic, 239
Lucretius and, 310–312
no-subject argument and, 236–239
time and, 159
tardigrades, 15
technological impossibility, irreversibility and, 26–28
temporal parts, 106–108
boundaries and, 115–116
dualism without, 131–133
four-dimensionalism and, 164n4
materialism without, 134–145, 149n42
metaphysics of, 115–116
Proteanism and, 114–130
Teresa of Avila, 203
Termination Thesis (TT)
alternate version of, 47n12
of dying, 7–9
Epicurus and, 257
eternalism and, 9, 10t
existence and, 8
personality argument for, 61, 66, 70, 74
presentism and, 9, 10t
remains and, 7–8
revitalization and, 25
subsequentism and, 264
“that,” desire and, 289–291
Thomas Aquinas, 133, 149n36, 195
Thomism, 133, 146n8
Thomson, Judith, 458n14
time
atemporalism and, 266–270
closed, 170–171, 182n11
as cyclical, 167–168
of death, 40–44
death and, 160–163
“dies” and, 11–12
eternal recurrence and, 167–168
eternalism and, 7
future bias and, 246–247
as “grainy,” 46n9
as “gunky,” 46n9
hegemony of personal, 247–253
incommensurable, 251–253
“is dying” and, 12
“later than” and, 170–171
as like space, 158
linear, 169–170
metaphysics of, 158–160
modality and, 158
movement in, 173–175
permanence and, 18–19
presentism and, 7
reality and, 158–159
subjectivity and, 174
symmetry and, 159
Tithonus, 338
Tooley, Michael, 61–62, 71
Tragic Sense of Life (Unamuno), 369
traumatic brain injury, 244
TT. See Termination Thesis (TT)
Unamuno, Miguel de, 369
unconscious, killing vs. knocking, 396–398
Unequal Harm of Death Judgment, 420–422
uniformity, atemporalism and, 267
utilitarianism, 238, 467, 483–488
van Inwagen, Peter, 6, 98, 112, 136, 140, 143
Velleman, David, 382n51
Vermeule, Adrian, 489
virtue, 197–198
vitality, of personality
in biological view, 65–66
in moral view, 74
in psychological view, 69
Walzer, Michael, 434
Wedberg, Anders, 169
well-being, 257, 265, 391–392, 398–400
Weyl, Hermann, 174
when, of death, 40–44
Wierenga, Edward, 34
Wiggins, David, 76n4
Wilkes, Kathleen, 77n18, 361–362
Williams, Donald, 248
Williams syndrome, 240–241
Wilson, Jack, 35
wisdom, Socratic, 187–188
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 81, 222–223
Wreen, Michael, 17
wrongs, retroactive, 332–334
“you,” corpse as, 82
Yourgrau, Palle, 161
Zeno, 251
Zohar, Noam, 459n26