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date: 06 December 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines recent empirical research and theoretical accounts of inductive reasoning. The first section focuses on property induction between categories. Key phenomena are described and major theoretical models of induction are compared. This section highlights the importance of induction in domains where people have rich background knowledge and research on inductive development in the evaluation of competing models. The next section considers the important but neglected issue of how people make inductive inferences about specific instances. The final sections examine three emerging areas of inductive research: induction when category membership is uncertain, the relationship between inductive and deductive reasoning, and the neural substrates of reasoning. We conclude that future progress in the field will come through the development of broader paradigms that examine induction across a wider range of stimulus domains and models that link induction to other kinds of reasoning and cognitive activities.

Keywords: induction, reasoning, categorization, concepts, knowledge, probability judgment, uncertainty

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