- Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy
- Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy
- Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
- Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals
- A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
- Utilitarianism and Animals
- Rights Theory and Animal Rights
- The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements
- The Idea of Moral Standing
- Animals, Fundamental Moral Standing, and Speciesism
- Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons
- Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?
- Animal Mentality: Its Character, Extent, and Moral Significance
- Mindreading and Moral Significance in Nonhuman Animals
- Minimal Minds
- Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
- Animal Pain and Welfare: Can Pain Sometimes Be Worse for Them than for Us?
- Animals That Act for Moral Reasons
- The Moral Life of Animals
- On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations
- On the Nature of Species and the Moral Significance of their Extinction
- Are All Species Equal?
- Genetically Modified Animals: Should There Be Limits to Engineering the Animal Kingdom?
- Human/Nonhuman Chimeras: Assessing the Issues
- The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals
- The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death
- The Ethics of Confining Animals: From Farms to Zoos to Human Homes
- Keeping Pets
- Animal Experimentation in Biomedical Research
- Ethical Issues in the Application of Biotechnology to Animals in Agriculture
- Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
- The Use of Animals in Toxicological Research
- What's Ethics Got to Do with it?: The Roles of Government Regulation in Research-Animal Protection
- Literary Works and Animal Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
The term “chimera” has many meanings, but this article's concern is restricted to living organisms that have, as part of their bodies, some living tissues, organs, or structures of human origin and some of nonhuman origin. The discussion confines the analysis to creatures that are, or are viewed as, nonhuman creatures to which human tissues are added. It points out that most of the discussion took off from scientific study of the Human Neuron Mouse and focused on nonhuman creatures with “humanized” brains. It then describes the arguments and policies that have developed in regard to human/nonhuman chimeras, and this is followed by a discussion of three particularly sensitive types of chimeras. Such developments can be used to create important human knowledge and medical treatments, but they need to be employed only for such good reasons.
Henry T. Greely is the Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law, and Professor, by courtesy, of Genetics at Stanford University. He directs Stanford’s Center for Law and the Biosciences and the Stanford Interdisciplinary Group on Neuroscience and Society. He is a co-founder of the Neuroethics Society and member of its Executive Committee.
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