- Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy
- Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy
- Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
- Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals
- A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
- Utilitarianism and Animals
- Rights Theory and Animal Rights
- The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements
- The Idea of Moral Standing
- Animals, Fundamental Moral Standing, and Speciesism
- Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons
- Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?
- Animal Mentality: Its Character, Extent, and Moral Significance
- Mindreading and Moral Significance in Nonhuman Animals
- Minimal Minds
- Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
- Animal Pain and Welfare: Can Pain Sometimes Be Worse for Them than for Us?
- Animals That Act for Moral Reasons
- The Moral Life of Animals
- On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations
- On the Nature of Species and the Moral Significance of their Extinction
- Are All Species Equal?
- Genetically Modified Animals: Should There Be Limits to Engineering the Animal Kingdom?
- Human/Nonhuman Chimeras: Assessing the Issues
- The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals
- The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death
- The Ethics of Confining Animals: From Farms to Zoos to Human Homes
- Keeping Pets
- Animal Experimentation in Biomedical Research
- Ethical Issues in the Application of Biotechnology to Animals in Agriculture
- Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
- The Use of Animals in Toxicological Research
- What's Ethics Got to Do with it?: The Roles of Government Regulation in Research-Animal Protection
- Literary Works and Animal Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
This article considers the concept of persons as the central issue in moral status debates. It finds questions about whether members of one or more nonhuman species of animals are persons among the most difficult philosophical questions we face today. It locates the difficulty in two sources: how the concept of a person should be analyzed, especially the properties that give an entity a right to continued existence; and how to determine which psychological capacities and which forms of mental life adult members of nonhuman species have. It argues that the fact that something is a continuing subject of experiences and has mental states that are psychologically connected over time is crucial to creatures having moral status and having a right to continued existence.
Michael Tooley is Distinguished College Professor in Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder. His publications include <i>Causation: A Realist Approach</i> (Oxford University Press, 1987); <i>Time, Tense, and Causation</i> (Oxford University Press, 1997); ‘Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism’ in <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i>, 50, Supplement (1990); ‘The Nature of Causation: A Singularist Account’ in D. Copp (ed.), <i>Canadian Philosophers: Celebrating Twenty Years of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i>, <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i>, Supplementary 16 (1990); and ‘Causation and Supervenience’ in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds.), <i>Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics</i> (Oxford University Press, 2003).
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.