- The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza
- Commonly Cited English Translations
- The Virtues of Geometry
- From Maimonides to Spinoza: Three Versions of an Intellectual Transition
- Spinoza and Descartes
- The Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes, and Modes
- But Why Was Spinoza a Necessitarian?
- The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza
- Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathematics, Motion, and Being
- Representation, Misrepresentation, and Error in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind
- Finite Subjects in the Ethics: Spinoza on Indexical Knowledge, the First Person, and the Individuality of Human Minds
- Spinoza on Skepticism
- The Highest Good and Perfection in Spinoza
- Spinoza on Mind
- The Intellectual Love of God
- The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion
- Spinoza’s Unorthodox Metaphysics of the Will
- Spinoza’s Philosophy of Religion
- Spinoza’s Political Philosophy
- Leibniz’s Encounter with Spinoza’s Monism, October 1675 to February 1678
- Playing with Fire: Hume, Rationalism, and a Little Bit of Spinoza
- Kant and Spinoza Debating the Third Antinomy
- “Nothing Comes from Nothing”: Judaism, the Orient, and Kabbalah in Hegel’s Reception of Spinoza
- Nietzsche and Spinoza: Enemy-Brothers
- Spinoza’s Afterlife in Judaism and the Task of Modern Jewish Philosophy
- Spinoza’s Relevance to Contemporary Metaphysics
- Literary Spinoza
Abstract and Keywords
If Kant wanted to combat dogmatism—if he wanted to deny knowledge in order to make room for freedom and faith—he must have taken Spinoza seriously. In considering the case of the third Antinomy, the chapter argues, contrary to the prevalent view, that he did. The first part of the chapter challenges the historical pieces of evidence (allegedly) supporting the conclusion that Kant never engaged with Spinoza in the first Critique. The second part considers the third Antinomy, arguing that its Antithesis, eliminating freedom by invoking the Principle of Sufficient Reason, articulates a Spinozist position—not a Leibnizian one, as is commonly assumed. The third part explores the chief Spinozist challenge to the Antinomy, drawing on Spinoza’s understanding of infinity, freedom, and adequate ideas. The conclusion defends Kant’s position by confronting Spinoza’s position on infinity and freedom with Kant’s account of the sublime.
Omri Boehm is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research. He is the author of Kant’s Critique of Spinoza (2014) and of The Binding of Isaac: A Religious Model of Disobedience (2007), as well as essays on Kant, early modern philosophy, and philosophy of religion.
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