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date: 21 February 2020

(p. xi) Notes on the Contributors

(p. xi) Notes on the Contributors

John P. Burgess, Ph.D. in Logic, Berkeley (1975), has taught since 1976 at Princeton, where he is now Director of Undergraduate Studies. His interests include logic, philosophy of mathematics, metaethics, and pataphysics. He is the author of numerous articles on mathematical and philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics, and of Fixing Frege and (with Gideon Rosen) A Subject with No Object (Oxford University Press, 1997).



Charles Chihara is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle (1973), Constructibility and Mathematical Existence (Oxford University Press, 1990), The Worlds of Possibility: Model Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic (Oxford University Press, 1998), and A Structural Account of Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 2004).



Peter J. Clark is Reader in Logic and Metaphysics and Head of the School of Philosophical and Anthropological Studies in the University of St. Andrews. He works primarily in the philosophy of physical science and mathematics and is editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.



Roy Cook is a Visiting Professor at Villanova University and an Associate Fellow at the Arché Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews. He has published on the philosophy of logic, language, and mathematics in numerous journals including Philosophia Mathematica, Mind, The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, and Analysis.



William Demopoulos has published articles in diverse fields in the philosophy of the exact sciences, and on the development of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. He is a member of the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science of the University of California, Irvine.



Michael Detlefsen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Hilbert's Program: An Essay on Mathematical Instrumentalism (1986) and editor of Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.



Solomon Feferman is Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy and the Patrick Suppes Professor of Humanities and Sciences, Emeritus, at Stanford University. He is the author of numerous articles on logic and the foundations of mathematics and of In the Light of Logic (Oxford University Press, 1998), editor in chief of the Collected Works of Kurt Gödel (vols. I–V, Oxford University Press, 1986–2003), and author with Anita B. Feferman of Truth and Consequences: The Life and Logic of Alfred Tarski (forthcoming). Feferman received the Rolf Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy for 2003.



Juliet Floyd is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, working primarily on the interplay between logic, mathematics, and philosophy in early twentieth‐century philosophy. She has written articles on Kant, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Gödel, and (with Sanford Shieh) edited Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2001).



Bob Hale is Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.



Geoffrey Hellman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota. He is author of Mathematics Without Numbers (Oxford University Press, 1989) and edited Quantum Measurement: Beyond Paradox (1998) with Richard Healey. He has published numerous research papers in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, and general philosophy of science. He also has an interest in musical aesthetics and remains active as a concert pianist.



Ignacio Jané is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Logic and the History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Barcelona. His main interests are in the foundations of mathematics, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic. He is the author of “A Critical Appraisal of Second‐order Logic” (History and Philosophy of Logic, 1993), “The Role of Absolute Infinity in Cantor's Conception of Set” (Erkenntnis, 1995), and “Reflections on Skolem's Relativity of Set‐Theoretical Concepts” (Philosophia Mathematica, 2001).



Fraser MacBride is a Reader in the School of Philosophy at Birkbeck College London. He previously taught in the Department of Logic & Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews and was a research fellow at University College London. He has written several articles on the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy, and is the editor of The Foundations of Mathematics and Logic (special issue of The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 214 January 2004).



Penelope Maddy is Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Irvine. Her work includes “Believing the Axioms” (Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1988), Realism in Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1990), and Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1997).



D. C. McCarty is member of the Logic Program at Indiana University.



Carl Posy is Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His work covers philosophical logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and the history of philosophy. He is editor of Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics: Modern Essays (1992). A recent publication on logic and the philosophy of mathematics is “Epistemology, Ontology and the Continuum” (in Mathematics and the Growth of Knowledge, E. Grossholz, ed., 2001). A recent paper on the history of philosophy is “Between Leibniz and Mill: Kant's Logic and the Rhetoric of Psychologism” (in Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy, D. Jacquette, ed., 2003).



Dag Prawitz is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Stockholm University, Emeritus (as of 2001). Most of his research is in proof theory, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. Some early works include Natural Deduction: A Proof‐Theoretical Study (1965), “Ideas and Results in Proof Theory” (Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, 1971), and “Philosophical Aspects of Proof Theory” (Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey, 1981). Some recent ones are “Truth and Objectivity from a Verificationist Point of View” (Truth in Mathematics, 1998), “Meaning and Objectivity” (Meaning and Interpretation, 2002), and replies to critic's in Theoria (1998) (special issue, “The Philosophy of Dag Prawitz”).



Agustín Rayo received his degree from MIT in 2000, and then spent four years at the AHRB Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Mind, at the University of St Andrews. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and works mainly on the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and language.



Michael D. Resnik is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (Oxford University Press, 1997) and Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics (1980), as well as a number of articles in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of logic.



Gideon Rosen is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He is the author (with John P. Burgess) of A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1997).



Lisa Shabel is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University. Her articles include “Kant on the ‘Symbolic Construction’ of Mathematical Concepts” (Studies in History of Philosophy of Science, 1998) and “Kant's ‘Argument from Geometry’ ” (Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2004). She has also published a monograph titled Mathematics in Kant's Critical Philosophy: Reflections on Mathematical Practice (2003).



Stewart Shapiro is the O'Donnell Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University and Professorial Fellow in the Research Centre Arché, at the University of St. Andrews. His publications include Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second‐order Logic (Oxford University Press, 1991) and Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (Oxford University Press, 1997).



John Skorupski is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. Among his publications are John Stuart Mill (1989), English‐Language Philosophy, 1750–1945 (1993), and Ethical Explorations (1999).



Mark Steiner is Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He received his B.A. from Columbia in 1965, was a Fulbright Fellow at Oxford in 1966, and received his Ph.D. at Princeton in 1972 (under Paul Benacerraf). He taught at Columbia from 1970 to 1977, when he joined the Philosophy Department of the Hebrew University. He is the author of Mathematical Knowledge (1975) and The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (1998).



Neil Tennant is Distinguished Humanities Professor at The Ohio State University. His publications include Anti‐realism in Logic (Oxford University Press, 1987) and The Taming of the True (Oxford University Press, 1997).



Alan Weir is Senior Lecturer at Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland. He has also taught at the universities of Edinburgh and Birmingham and at Balliol College, Oxford. He has published articles on logic and philosophy of mathematics in a number of journals, including Mind, Philosophia Mathematica, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, and Grazer Philosophische Studien.



Crispin Wright is Bishop Wardlaw Professor at the University of St. Andrews, Global Distinguished Professor at New York University, and Director of the Research Centre, Arché. His writings in the philosophy of mathematics include Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (1980); Frege's Conception of (p. xv) Numbers as Objects (1983); and, with Bob Hale, The Reason's Proper Study (Oxford University Press, 2001). His most recent books, Rails to Infinity (2001) and Saving the Differences (2003), respectively collect his writings on central themes of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and those further developing themes of his Truth and Objectivity (1992).



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