- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
- Notes on the Contributors
- Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: Introduction
- A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period
- Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
- The Logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell
- Logicism in the Twenty‐first Century
- Logicism Reconsidered
- Intuitionism and Philosophy
- Intuitionism in Mathematics
- Intuitionism Reconsidered
- Quine and the Web of Belief
- Three Forms of Naturalism
- Naturalism Reconsidered
- Nominalism Reconsidered
- Structuralism Reconsidered
- Mathematics—Application and Applicability
- Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory
- Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
- Relevance in Reasoning
- No Requirement of Relevance
- Higher‐order Logic
- Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered
Abstract and Keywords
The philosophical literature contains numerous claims on behalf of and numerous claims against higher-order logic. Virtually all of the issues apply to second-order logic (vis-à-vis first-order logic), so this article focuses on that. It develops the syntax of second-order languages and present typical deductive systems and model-theoretic semantics for them. This will help to explain the role of higher-order logic in the philosophy of mathematics. It is assumed that the reader has at least a passing familiarity with the theory and metatheory of first-order logic.
Stewart Shapiro is O'Donnell Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University and Professorial Fellow at the Arche Centre, University of St. Andrews.
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