- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
- Notes on the Contributors
- Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: Introduction
- A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period
- Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
- The Logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell
- Logicism in the Twenty‐first Century
- Logicism Reconsidered
- Intuitionism and Philosophy
- Intuitionism in Mathematics
- Intuitionism Reconsidered
- Quine and the Web of Belief
- Three Forms of Naturalism
- Naturalism Reconsidered
- Nominalism Reconsidered
- Structuralism Reconsidered
- Mathematics—Application and Applicability
- Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory
- Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
- Relevance in Reasoning
- No Requirement of Relevance
- Higher‐order Logic
- Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered
Abstract and Keywords
The extent to which practicing mathematicians of a conventional tendency are already intuitionists is reassuring. Today's mathematicians treat mathematical claims much as Brouwer once did: as independently meaningful efforts to record mathematical facts which are, when true, demonstrable from proofs rooted in basic assumptions or principles. Until they are proven, those assumptions rest upon intuitions: illuminating, at times fallible, insights into the dynamical behaviors of numbers, sets, functions, and operations on them.
D. C. McCarty is member of the Logic Program at Indiana University.
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