Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 19 February 2020

Abstract and Keywords

People come, early and easily, to think in moral terms. What they think, when they are thinking in these terms, often has a large impact on their decisions and actions, as well as on their responses to what others do. Moral thinking is a familiar and vital aspect of one's life. Yet when people ask themselves honestly what it is they are thinking, in thinking some acts are right and others wrong, that some things are good, others bad, that some character traits are virtues, other vices, it turns out to be extremely difficult to say. This article characterizes moral realism as the position that: there are moral facts, people's moral judgments are made true or false by the moral facts, and the mere fact that we have the moral beliefs we have is not what makes the moral facts be as they are.

Keywords: moral terms, moral thinking, moral facts, moral realism, moral judgments

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.