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date: 24 February 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article explores a variety of conceptions of moral responsibility and their connection to the idea of free will. Its main focus is on the challenge of causal determinism. Much has been written recently about free will and moral responsibility. This article focuses on the relationship between free will, on the one hand, and various notions that fall under the rubric of “morality,” broadly construed, on the other: deliberation and practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical notions such as “ought,” “right,” “wrong,” “good,” and “bad.” It begins by laying out a natural understanding of freedom of the will. Next, it develops some challenges to the common-sense view that there is this sort of freedom. It goes on to explore the implications of this challenge for deliberation, moral responsibility, and the central ethical notions.

Keywords: moral responsibility, free will, determinism, morality, ethical notions

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