- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience
- Contributors
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience
- Introduction
- Molecules, Systems, and Behavior: Another View of Memory Consolidation
- Biological Clocks: Explaining with Models of Mechanisms
- Methodology and Reduction in the Behavioral Neurosciences: Object Exploration as a Case Study
- The Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions
- The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What Do Spinal Cords Reveal?
- Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics
- Learning, Neuroscience, and the Return of Behaviorism
- fMRI: A Modern Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain
- The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field?
- The Role of Neurobiology in Differentiating the Senses
- Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless?
- Space, Time, and Objects
- Neurocomputational Models: Theory, Application, Philosophical Consequences
- Neuroanatomy and Cosmology
- The Emerging Theory of Motivation
- Inference to the Best Decision
- Emergentism at the Crossroads of Philosophy, Neurotechnology, and the Enhancement Debate
- What's “Neu” in Neuroethics?
- Confabulations about People and Their Limbs, Present or Absent
- Delusional Experience
- The Case for Animal Emotions: Modeling Neuropsychiatric Disorders
- Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology
- Neuro‐Eudaimonics or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the Seat of Happiness
- The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article argues that claims of the subjectivity of consciousness are very strong empirical claims about the structure, acquisition, and content of concepts. It describes various neurophilosophical accounts of concepts and consciousness and builds a case against the subjectivity of consciousness. It contends that subjectivity eliminativism is superior over subjectivity reductionism and evaluates the proposal that one can only have the concept of what it is like to have certain experiences if one has had those experiences.
Keywords: consciousness, subjectivity, concepts, subjectivity eliminativism, subjectivity reductionism, experiences
Pete Mandik is Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy and Director of Cognitive Science at William Paterson University. His main current research interest is the neural basis for conscious experience. He has over 30 articles on this and other topics, including mental representation, enactive and embodied cognition, and artificial life. He is coauthor of Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain and coeditor of Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. He was a junior member and codirector of the McDonnell Project for Philosophy and the Neurosciences and is coeditor of the forthcoming book Brain to Mind: Reports from the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. He writes Brain Hammer, his intermittently neurophilosophical blog.
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- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience
- Contributors
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience
- Introduction
- Molecules, Systems, and Behavior: Another View of Memory Consolidation
- Biological Clocks: Explaining with Models of Mechanisms
- Methodology and Reduction in the Behavioral Neurosciences: Object Exploration as a Case Study
- The Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions
- The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What Do Spinal Cords Reveal?
- Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics
- Learning, Neuroscience, and the Return of Behaviorism
- fMRI: A Modern Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain
- The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field?
- The Role of Neurobiology in Differentiating the Senses
- Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless?
- Space, Time, and Objects
- Neurocomputational Models: Theory, Application, Philosophical Consequences
- Neuroanatomy and Cosmology
- The Emerging Theory of Motivation
- Inference to the Best Decision
- Emergentism at the Crossroads of Philosophy, Neurotechnology, and the Enhancement Debate
- What's “Neu” in Neuroethics?
- Confabulations about People and Their Limbs, Present or Absent
- Delusional Experience
- The Case for Animal Emotions: Modeling Neuropsychiatric Disorders
- Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology
- Neuro‐Eudaimonics or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the Seat of Happiness
- The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity
- Index
