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date: 07 August 2020

(p. 587) Index

(p. 587) Index

a posteriori justification, 110–111, 122
a posteriori knowledge, 97, 103, 113–114
a priori judgment, 112
a priori justification, 98, 100–106, 109–111
basic, 495–496
defeasibility of, 98, 107–108
indefeasibility condition for, 109, 120
sources of, 98, 103–105
strength of, 98, 106
a priori knowledge, 95–138, 157, 494–495
impure epistemic analyses of, 99, 101–103
non‐epistemic analyses of, 99–101
pure epistemic analyses of, 99, 103–106
a priori proposition. See a priori truth
a priori truth, 99, 101, 105, 239
abstract entities, 126–131
acceptance, 396, 351–357
access coherentism, 229
access internalism, 217–218
accessibility, cognitive, 234
of the a priori, 239
of justification, 235
of mental states, 238
acquaintance, 215–218. See also knowledge, by acquaintance
adequacy, criterion of, 106–108
Alston, William, 491, 497, 524–525, 534
analytic epistemology, 465
analytic philosophy, 169
analyticity, 96, 98–100, 126
analytic‐synthetic distinction, 95–97, 125–126
Anderson, Tony, 547
Annis, David, 225
Anselm, 515
anti‐realism, 217, 326
apprehension of properties of objects, 118
Aquinas, Thomas, 515
Aristotle, 287, 294–295, 297–298, 309, 311, 357, 465, 533, 541, 559
Armstrong, David, 221, 559–560
assent, 336
associationism, 159
Audi, Robert, 29–30
axioms, 102–103
Ayer, A. J., 29, 207, 214
Bacon, Francis, 390
Baier, Annette, 475
basic belief, 187, 526–528
basic propositions, 355–356
Bayesian conditionalization, 395
Bayesianism, 393–397, 434–457
Bealer, George, 133–134
beg the question, 354, 483
belief
categorical, 438, 447–451, 453
condition for knowledge, 26–30
nonfoundational, 493
noninferential, 431
pragmatic benefits of, 184–186
properly basic, 526
properly basic theistic, 531, 534–535
revisability, 192
warranted theistic, 536
Benacerraf, Paul, 97, 126
Bentham, Jeremy, 422
Berkeley, George, 146
biased sample, fallacy of, 427
BonJour, Laurence, 39, 101, 104, 117–120, 133–135, 217–218, 226, 229
Brabeck, Mary, 469
brain, 151, 160–161
Braine, David, 46
Brandt, Richard, 502–504, 506–507, 509 (p. 588)
Brentano, Franz, 496
Bromberger, Sylvain, 418
Burge, Tyler, 548
Buridan, Jean, 546–547
Butchvarov, Panayot, 104
Cantor, Georg, 546
Carnap, Rudolph, 387, 391–394, 563–564
Carneades, 337
Cartesian demon, 86, 246–248, 289, 292, 303, 325
Castañeda, Hector Neri, 41–43
causal responsibility, 309–310
causal theory of justification, 206
causal theory of knowledge, 178–179
certainty, 98, 102–103, 199, 448, 457
Chomsky, Noam, 154–156, 159
circular reasoning, 306, 565
Clarke, Samuel, 519–520
Clifford, William K, 363–364, 367–368, 370, 372
Clifford’s shipowner, 367–368, 370, 372, 381
closure principle, 145–146, 339–348, 541. See also epistemic closure
Code, Lorraine, 297–298, 464, 475
cogency, 516–517
cognitive science, 146–147, 156, 159. See also psychology
cognitive virtues, 46–48, 250. See also knowledge, virtue analyses of
Cohen, L. Jonathan, 25–29
Cohen, Stewart, 60
coherence, 87–91, 290, 299–301, 496, 504, 509
coherentism, 179, 187–188, 226–231, 241, 288–291, 354, 356–358, 492–502, 504–505
access, 229
conceptual, 89–90
explanatory, 431. See also Explanationism
common sense epistemology, 489
competence, 264–284
completeness concern, the, 558–564
confidence
and acceptance, 451–456
and belief, 449–451, 454–455
and categorical belief, 447–450, 453
and preference, 443–446
confirmation theory, 393–394, 425–426. See also logic of confirmation
conjunction rule of probability, 148–150
consciousness, 72–74, 76, 90. See also introspection
consistency, 227
context, 464
contextualism, 225–226, 349–352
contextually a priori, 109
contingence, 99, 113
contingent proposition. See contingent truth
contingent truth, 103, 135
contrastive focus, 25–26
Cornman, James, 417
correspondence, 217
Cosmides, Leda, 151–152
Cowey, Fiona, 157–158
criterial‐conceptual distinction, 111
Dalmiya, Vrinda, 298
Darwin, Charles, 167
Davidson, Donald, 47, 60, 327–328, 564
Davidson’s swampman, 327–328
Dawkins, Richard, 170
decision theory, 434–457
Deductive‐Nomological (D‐N) theory, 409–410, 418–419
defeasibility, 43–46, 83–85, 91, 108–109, 178, 493
defeater, 44, 73, 84–89, 91, 105–108, 129, 135, 137, 493, 495–496, 531
misleading, 43–44
overriding, 107–108, 135
undermining, 108, 135
defeating evidence, 123, 127, 496
definitions, 124
Dehaene, Stanislas, 159, 161–162
deliverances, 269–272, 275–276
Dennett, Daniel, 557 (p. 589)
Descartes, Rene, 28, 78, 153, 180, 214, 223, 235, 238, 317, 319–321, 326, 338–339, 423, 507–508, 554
Dewey, John, 417
diffusion
of belief, 170–171
of knowledge, 169–171
direct realist, 239
dispositions, 328–329
of beliefs, 329–330
doxastic practice, a, 524
doxastic voluntarism, 237, 369
Dretske, Fred, 25–26, 343–344, 352, 555
Duhem, Pierre, 284
Durkheim, Emile, 532
economic theory, 165–169
EEG argument, 123
eliminativism, 543
Ellis, Brian, 562
embodiment of knowers, 463–475
emotions, 475, 496–497
emotivism, 486
empirical investigation, 135–137
empirical justification, 106–108
empirical knowledge, 95
empiricism, 126, 147, 157–159
empiricist
accounts of mathematical knowledge, 124–126
radical, 109, 116–120, 132, 137
epistemic achievement, 145–147
epistemic attainment. See epistemic achievement
epistemic autonomy, 83–87
epistemic circularity, 317–318, 517–518
epistemic closure, 553–556, 558
epistemic duty, 236–237, 362–383
epistemic goal, 370–371, 376–380
epistemic logic, 540–566
epistemic overdetermination, 125
epistemic responsibility, 475. See also epistemic duty
epistemic semantics, 561–562
epistemic virtue, 46, 237, 287–312, 493. See also cognitive virtue
epistemicism, 562–563
epistemological success, 376–380, 382
ethical cognitivism, 487
ethical skepticism, 480–488
ethics, 479–509
evidence, 122–124, 155–156, 192, 307
and inductive inference, 428
justifying, 123
law of, 162–165
and statistical inference, 428
evidence gathering, 371
evidence paths, 344
evidential underdetermination, 153–156
evil demon hypothesis, 153–154, 223. See also Cartesian demon
evil genius hypothesis, 347. See also evil demon hypothesis
evil, the problem of, 531–532
Ewing, A. C., 495
experience, 95, 105–106, 112–115, 117, 289
experiential evidence, 105, 113–115, 122–123
experiential justification, 110–112, 117, 119
explanation, 408–431
Explanationism, 408, 417–431
ferocious, 417, 426–431
sturdy, 417
weak, 417–426
explanatory inference, 408, 412–414, 417, 427–429
explanatory requirement, the, 484
explanatory virtues, 414–417, 420–421
Fairweather, Abrol, 46
feminist epistemology, 463–475
Feuerbach, Ludwig, 532
Fitch, Frederic, 542
Fitch proof, the, 542–546
Fodor, Jerry, 159
Foley, Richard, 208–209, 227
foundationalism, 179, 187–188, 210–223, 230–231, 241–242, 288–291, 355–357, 479, 492–502
modest, 493, 495–496
radical, 492
rationalistic, 494, 496
regress arguments for, 210–213
reliabilist, 492
freedom of speech, 166
Frege, Gottlob, 387, 391, 404, 554
Freud, Sigmund, 532–533, 537
Galileo, 550
gender
vs. biological sex, 470–472
and cognition, 468–469
and theorizing in epistemology, 469–472
generality problem, 37–38, 40, 47, 250–251, 253–254
Gettier, Edmund, 30–32, 178–179, 308, 344–345
Gettier counterexamples, 30, 31, 35, 38, 43, 178, 179, 181, 344, 556
Gettier problems, 32–33, 180–181, 302, 308–311
Gigerenzer, Gerd, 151–153
Gilligan, Carol, 468–469
Glymour, Clark, 392–426
goal‐oriented belief, 182, 208–209
Gödel, Kurt, 131, 546, 550
Goldman, Alvin I., 34, 36–39, 42–43, 127–128, 179, 223, 257, 266, 431, 560
Goldman’s reliabilism, 220
Goodman, Nelson, 153–154, 284, 421
Goodman’s “grue” paradox, 153–154, 426
Grim, Patrick, 553
Grünbaum, Adolf, 533
Haack, Susan, 224, 230
habits of thought, 281–284, 299–300
Hacking, Ian, 422–425
Hall, Richard J., 364, 366, 370–372, 376–378
Harding, Sandra, 472
Hare, Richard M., 487, 501–504, 506–507, 509
Harman, Gilbert, 32, 417, 427–428, 431
Hartshorne, Charles, 517
Hartsock, Nancy, 472
Hasker, William, 526, 530, 533, 535
having justification for a belief vs. having justified belief, 206–207
Hempel, Carl, 115–116, 387, 390–392, 409
Hilbert, David, 387, 391, 550
Hilpinen, Risto, 46
Hintikka, Jaakko, 541, 565–566
Hirschi, Travis, 164
historicism, 399–404, 406
holism, 388–389
Holmes, Justice, 165–166
Hosiasson‐Lindenbaum, Janina, 392
Hume, David, 304–308, 515, 522
hypothetico‐deductivism, 392
idealism, 543
ideology, 169–171
indications, 275–276. See also deliverances
indirect realist, 239
induction, enumerative, 427
inductive reasoning, 151
mechanisms, 151
inductivism, 124
infallible belief, 214
infallible justification, 215–216
inference, 77–78, 91, 307
inference rules, the skeptic’s, 554–558
inference to the best explanation. See explanatory inference
infinitism, 212, 354, 358
innate
faculties, 157–158
ideas, 157
mechanism, 159, 162
innateness, 156–159, 162
insufficient sample, fallacy of, 427
intellectual responsibility, 199, 236, 297–298
intellectual virtue, 272, 287–312. See also cognitive virtues
intentionality, 330
internalism, 179–180, 229, 217–218, 234–260
access, 217–218
introspection, 72, 270, 331, 466. See also consciousness
introspective knowledge, 123
intuition, 128–129
intuitive reason, 287
irrefutability, 114–116
Jaggar, Alison, 475
James, William, 363, 379
Jeffrey, Richard, 393–394, 450
Johnson, Charles R., 364, 366, 370–372, 376–378
Jones, Karen, 475
justification, 204–231, 258, 288, 426, 495–496
and being justified, 422
coherence theory of, 500
conceptual dependence of, 85
condition for knowledge, 29–30
and confirmation theory, 426
defeasibility of, 98, 107–108, 178
and emotions, 497
epistemic, 178–180, 205–206
explanationist theory of, 430
and explanatory inference, 427
internal, 293, 303, 309
mixed theories of, 230–231
and nondefectiveness, 178
nonepistemic, 205–206
noninferential, 210–220, 492. See also justification, foundational
objective, 311
relativization of, 228–229
sources of, 71–92, 98, 103–105, 108, 125, 132, 135, 138
strong vs. weak, 223, 248
subjective, 303, 309, 311
justified belief, 121, 177–182, 187, 195–200
and closure, 342
justified true belief, 178
justifiedness, 153–157, 182
justifying a belief vs. a belief’s being justified, 504
justifying evidence, 123
Kahneman, Daniel, 149–152
Kant, Immanuel, 29, 95–100, 111–114, 145, 465, 515
Kaplan, David, 545–546
Keller, Evelyn Fox, 473
Kim, Jaegwon, 409
Kitcher, Philip, 97, 103, 105–106, 120, 159, 257
Klein, Peter, 44, 212
knower paradox, the, 546–554
knowing
and emotions, 475
individualistic vs. social view of, 470
social dimensions of, 474
knowledge
by acquaintance, 52–53
“animal,” 258–259, 267–269, 291, 293, 299–301
basic, 79–80
basic sources of, 71–92
causal analyses of, 33–35, 126–127, 178–179
conclusive reasons analyses of, 40–43
conditional analyses of, 36–40
conditions for/components of, 178–180
defeasibility analyses of, 43–46
discursive, 55–58, 60–61
as epistemic attainment, 146
inferential, 492. See also knowledge, nonfoundational
as more valuable than true belief, 302, 311–312
nonfoundational, 492–493. See also knowledge, inferential
by proof, 545–553
“reflective,” 258–259, 291, 293, 299–301
reliability analyses of, 36–41, 179. See also reliabilism
situated, 475
sources of, 71–92, 147, 157, 269–272
standard analyses of, 29–30
virtue analyses of, 46–48
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 468–469
Kolmogorov axioms of probability, 434–437, 440–442
Kornblith, Hilary, 144
Kripke, Saul, 97, 103, 106, 113
Kuhn, Thomas, 388, 401–402
Kuhnian underdetermination, 403 (p. 592)
language acquisition, 153–156
Larned, Ann, 469
Laudan, Larry, 388
Lehrer, Keith, 27, 31–32, 35, 39–40, 42–46, 60, 214, 417, 429–430
Leibniz, Gottfried, 102, 114, 518, 554
Lewis, David, 225
liar paradox, the, 546–548
Lipton, Peter, 417, 419–420, 428
Little, Daniel, 169
logic, 148, 406
logic of confirmation, 391–394
logic of knowledge, 540–566
logic of necessity, 541–542
logical empiricism, 97, 114, 386–388, 390–391, 401–402, 404
logical positivism, 409, 543
Longino, Helen, 469–470, 474
Lycan, William, 421, 423, 426, 428, 430–431
Mackie, J. L., 258
Maddy, Penelope, 130–131
Maitzen, Stephen, 554
Makinson, D. C., 565
Malcolm, Norman, 517, 555–556
maleness, 469–470, 473
Martin, C. B., 327–328
Marx, Karl, 169–170, 532
Marx’s theory of ideology, 169
mathematical belief, 102, 107
mathematical definitions, 124
mathematical knowledge, 97, 112–114, 124, 126, 130–131, 485
mathematical propositions, 96–97, 106–107, 112–115, 124–126
mathematical statements. See mathematical propositions
mathematical truth, 126
mathematics, 116, 124, 130–131
philosophy of, 162
matters of fact, unobserved, 304–305
Mavrodes, George I., 516–517, 519–521, 525
McGinn, Colin, 552
Meinong, Alexius, 496
memetics, 170–171
memory, 72, 74–76, 81, 90–91, 240
Meno, 136
mental states, 238–239, 322, 329
methodological solipsism, 566
Mill, John Stuart, 114, 124–125, 159
Milton, John, 165
mind, 316–332
minimal principle of contradiction, 109–111
Mischel, Walter, 164
misleading defeater, 43–44
mixed theories of justification, 230–231
modal knowledge, 485
modal skepticism, 102
modal status
general, 112–113, 134
specific, 112
Modus Ponens, 148, 422
Montague, Richard, 545–546
Montmarquet, James, 293–295, 297
Moore, G. E., 339, 348, 508
moral certainty, 199
moral epistemology, 479–509
moral foundationalism, 479
moral language, 486–487
moral observation, 484
moral philosophy, 479–509
nativism, 156–162. See also rationalism
natural theology, 515–525
naturalism, 127
philosophical, 127–129
scientific, 127, 130–131
naturalistic epistemology, 144, 179
naturalized epistemology, 474–475
‘necessary’, 561
necessary‐contingent distinction, 95, 97, 101, 112–113
necessary propositions. See necessary truths
necessary truths, 97, 99–101, 103, 112–113, 134
necessity, 96, 98, 101–102, 111–114, 561–563
logic of, 541–542
Neurath, Otto, 400
Newton, John, 406
Nisbett, Richard, 164, 464, 467–469, 472 (p. 593)
nonaccidentality, 35–36
non‐basic propositions, 355
nonexclusivity, 168
nonnegligent belief, 200, 202
nonrivalry, 168
normativity, 207–209
Nozick, Robert, 41, 252–253, 345, 347
Nozickian tracking, 252–253, 265–266, 345
numerical cognition, 159–161
numerical knowledge, 157–162
object‐relations theory, 473
overriding defeater, 107–108, 135
Pappas, George, 430
Park, Roger, 164–165
Parsons, Charles, 547
particularism, 488–492, 502–509
Pascal, Blaise, 183, 185–186, 193
Pascal’s wager, 185–186, 195, 423
Paxson, Thomas, Jr., 42
Peirce, Charles, 417, 423
perception, 71–74, 90–91, 239, 245, 270, 484
and the explanatory requirement, 484
perceptual belief, 197
phenomenalists, 555
philosophical naturalism, 127–129
Plato, 29, 204
political theory, 165
Popper, Karl, 28–29, 390
positivism, 126
practical knowledge, 114
pragmatic considerations, 193–196
pragmatism, 411
preferences, 457. See also confidence, and preference
prescriptivism, 486
probabilistic reasoning, 149–152
probability, Komolgorov axioms of, 434–437, 440–442
probability theory, 148, 150–151, 392–396, 417
process reliabilism, 127–129
proper basicality, 526–531, 533, 535
proper functionalism, 49–50, 253–256
propositional knowledge, 51
psychology, 144, 146, 152, 158–159, 162–165
Pyrrho, 337
Quinton, Anthony, 99–100
Radford, Colin, 26–28
Railton, Peter, 410
Ramsey, Frank, 450
rational acceptance, 452–454
rational belief, 177–189, 195–201
rational mechanism, 148–149
rational revisability, 109–111, 121, 126
rationalism, 147, 157–158
moderate, 117–120
traditional, 101
Rawls, John, 421
realism, 321–326
direct, 239
indirect, 239
realism/instrumentalism controversy, 387
reason, 72, 76–78, 90–91
reasonability, 182–183, 196, 201
reasonable belief, 177, 187
reasons for belief
epistemic, 188–193
non‐epistemic, 188–193
pragmatic, 189–191, 193
recursion, 539–540
Red Lion court, 166
reflective equilibrium, 421–422, 424, 427, 467
narrow, 421, 490
reformed epistemology, 525–538
regress, 102, 229, 354
regress arguments for foundationalism, 210–213 (p. 594)
regress problem, 354–357
Reichenbach, Hans, 390
Reid, Thomas, 79, 495
relevant alternatives, 31–32, 36–39, 43, 225, 277–279, 351–352, 558–561
reliabilist foundationalism, 492
religion, philosophy of, 513–538
religious diversity, the problem of, 533–534
religious epistemology, 513–538
replacement thesis, 144
representationalist, 239
representativeness heuristic, 149–150
responsibility, causal, 309–310
responsible belief, 195–201
Ross, Lee, 164
Ross, W. D., 493–494, 508–509
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 465
Rowe, William, 517, 519–521, 523
Russell, Bertrand, 215, 267, 387, 391, 404, 412, 494–496, 546, 559–561
Russell’s paradox, 77, 495–496, 546
Sacchiri, Gerolamo, 550
salience, 310
Schauer, Frederick, 166
Scheler, Max, 497
Scheman, Naomi, 472–473
Schmitt, Frederick, 37
Schopenhaur, Arthur, 552
Schott, Robin May, 472
science, 130–131, 144–171, 287, 475
of linguistics, 154–156
as promoter of oppressive hierarchies, 475
scientific explanationism, 411
scientific knowledge, 114, 127, 385–406
socio‐historical account of, 404–406
scientific method, 390, 394–395
scientific naturalism, 127, 130–131
scientific propositions, 114
Scriven, Michael, 411
seemings, 133
self‐deception, 192–193
self‐knowledge, 321–326
Sellars, Wilfrid, 216, 417, 430–431
semantics, externalist accounts of, 327
Semmelweis, Ignaz, 428
Sextus Empiricus, 337, 353–354, 565
Simon, Herbert, 152
simplicity, 125, 154–156, 194–195
situated knowledge, 475
situationalism, 163–164
Smullyan, Raymond, 547
social coherence theory, 227
social empiricism, 470
social epistemology, 162–163, 165–166, 169, 171
social psychology, 164–165
sociology, 169–171
of science, 170
solipsism, methodological, 566
Solovay, R. M., 130
Stalnaker, Robert, 51
standpoint theory, 472–473
Stevenson, C. L., 487
Stich, Stephen, 422, 464, 467–468, 472
Sudbury, Aidan, 544, 565
sufficient reason, principle of, 520
supervaluationism, 562–563
supervenience, 213, 491–492, 500–501
surprise test paradox, the, 542–546, 565
Swen, Blaine A., viii, 587
Swinburne, Richard, 100, 522–523
symbiotic theory of knowing, 60–61
synthetic apriori, 95–98, 145
testimony, 79–82, 90–91, 475
Thagard, Paul, 417, 431
theoretical virtues, 194 (p. 595)
thought content, theory of
causal, 322–326, 328
externalist, 322–327, 332
internalist, 327–332
Tolliver, Joseph, 428
Tooby, John, 151–152
total evidence, requirement of, 563–564
tracking, 264–284
‘true’, 547–548
true belief, 146, 302
truth, 165–168
and closure, 342
condition for knowledge, 25–26, 28–30
truth‐conduciveness, 134, 136–137
truth‐valuational properties, 171
truth value, 112–114, 134
Turing, Alan, 546
Tversky, Amos, 149–152
Tymoczko, Thomas, 547, 553
underdetermination, 153–156, 401–403
undermining defeater, 108, 135
undermining evidence, 128
understanding, 298–301
unexplainers, 430–431
Unger, Peter, 35–36, 560
universality, 96
vagueness, 562–563
epistemicist treatment of, 562
supervaluationist treatment of, 562
Van Cleve, James, 320
Van Fraassen, Bas, 411, 418–420, 422–423, 425–426
virtue, 279–284
virtue perspectivism, 288–293
virtue theory, 187
Vogel, Jonathan, 555
Walker, L. J., 469
warrant, 146, 196, 221, 253–256, 356–357, 526, 535–536
autonomous, 356–358
warranted belief, 177–182, 187, 196, 200
Whewell, William, 524
White, Alan R., 28–29, 52
Williamson, Timothy, 562–563
wisdom, 298–301
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 322, 559
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 525
Wright, Crispin, 544, 565
Zagzebski, Linda, 46, 48, 294–301, 311