Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 07 August 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. It considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower's paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. This article reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant-alternatives model of knowledge. This model assumes that “know” is an absolute term like “flat.” This article also argues that epistemic absolute terms differ from extensional absolute terms by virtue of their sensitivity to the completeness of the alternatives. This asymmetry undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness. Finally, this article suggests that the ability of logical demonstration to produce knowledge has been overestimated.

Keywords: epistemological issues, knower paradox, epistemic absolute terms, extensional absolute terms, epistemicist theories

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.