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date: 26 January 2021

(p. 605) Index

(p. 605) Index

a priori, 149–175;
and causal connections 159–160;
empiricist challenges to, 158–160;
and necessity, 156–157
abilities, 126–127;
as conceptually irreducible, 589–590;
and favorable environment, 126, 589–601;
for perceptual discrimination, 591–592;
recognitional, 588–590, 596;
second‐order recognitional, 596–597. See also virtues, intellectual
abstract‐ideas thesis, 252, 254–257, 264 n. 7
Academic Skepticism, 61–68
acceptance (as distinct from mere belief), 30
Aenesidemus, 15, 20, 31 n. 22, 62
agent reliabilism, 123–126, 562–563
Alston, William, 20, 294, 344, 489–490, 499, 509, 519–522
alternative possibilities, 456–483;
argument for skepticism, 114–116, 124–127;
and discriminating evidence, 115. See also relevant alternatives
analytic truths, 134–135, 158
analytic‐synthetic distinction, 314
Anderson, C. Anthony, 170 n. 16
Anselm, 71
antiluck epistemology, 437–455
antirealism. See realism
Antony, Louise, 171 n. 23
appearance versus reality, 20–21, 74, 118
Aquinas, Thomas, 71
Arcesilaus, 61–63
argument from ignorance, 334–341, 560
argument from illusion, 585–588, 593, 596. See also brain‐in‐a‐vat (BIV); dream argument; skeptical hypotheses
ataraxia, 61, 273, 559
Audi, Robert, 489, 495
Austin, J.L., 311, 348–371;
knowledge and giving one's word, 357, 367–368 n. 16;
and ordinary language philosophy, 349;
philosophical method and ordinary practices, 352–366;
on ruling out dream‐type hypotheses, 348–351, 358–366
Axtell, Guy, 561
Ayer, A.J., 132, 138, 171 n. 24, 288
Battaly, Heather, 568–573; 575 n. 10
Benacerraf, Paul, 172 n. 25
Berkeley, Bishop George, 117–118, 247–264;
and certainty, 260–263;
esse est percipi, 253–254, 257;
indirect realism and skepticism, 255;
response to skepticism, 256–260;
understanding of skepticism, 250–251
Bernard of Arezzo, 68–69
Bernecker, Sven, 563–567
Bett, Richard, 31 n. 22
Bible, James 2:19, 207;
John 7:17, 213; 16:8, 13–14, 209;
Romans 8:20–21, 206
Blackburn, Simon, 134, 178–185, 192–193, 195–196
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael, 426–427
Boghossian, Paul, 28, 170 n. 16, 412 n. 2,
BonJour, Laurence, 32 n. 30, 49, 133, 136, 139–141, 168 n. 5, 170 n. 15–176, 171 n. 19, 289, 305 n. 5, 345, 489, 496, 501 n. 8, 506–507, 509, 545, 566, 576 n. 1
brain‐in‐a‐vat (BIV), 225, 227, 240, 441–446
Broad, C.D., 130
Brooke, J.A., 170 n. 15
Brown, James Robert, 172 n. 25
Burge, Tyler, 170 n. 14, 173 n. 40
Burnyeat, Miles, 64–67
Butchvarov, Panayot, 170 n. 15
Carnap, Rudolph, 134, 146 n. 3
Carneades, 61
Cartesianism, 53–79, 353–366, 396, 400. See also Principle of Exclusion
Cavell, Stanley, 359
Chalmers, David, 169 n. 11
chicken sexer case, 48, 444–445, 447–448
Chisholm, Roderick, 34, 36, 42–47, 171 n. 20, 289, 299–300, 302, 330–331, 345, 359, 507
Chrisman, Matthew, 198 n. 27
Cicero, 62–63, 65–66
closure, 456–483, 505;
defense of, 476–480;
for justification, 550 n. 2;
mathematical, 457–459;
motivations for, 474–476;
(p. 606)
multipremise, 478–479;
under competent deduction, 466–468
Cohen, Stewart, 296, 309 n. 54, 520, 529 n. 55, 552 n. 30
coherentism, 48–49, 170 n. 14, 494–496, 499;
emergent, 496–499
compatibilism, epistemic, 561–574;
moral responsibility, 394
conceivability, 136–137
Conee, Earl, 342, 508–509
confirmation theory, 543–544
Confucianism, 202
content‐externalism, 445, 454 n. 9
contextualism, 234, 239, 333–337, 415–436, 473, 505;
airport case, 418–420, 431–433;
“know”‐“flat” comparison, 418, 424–427;
and the live‐hypothesis principle, 239–240;
objections to, 425–430;
as a response to skepticism, 119–121, 420–422;
as a semantic thesis, 119, 418;
versions of, 423–425
counterexamples, value of, 38–39
counterpossibilities, 238
Courtenay, William, 76 n. 55
Craig, Edward, 291–292
critical philosophy, 273–277
crystal‐ball gazer problem, 26, 513, 522–523
Damian, Peter, 71
Darwin, Charles, 271–272
de Bary, Philip, 299
de dicto grasp and de re grasp, 157
default and challenge model (DCM), 568, 570–574
defeasibility, 161–162
defeaters, external and internal, 478;
rebutting and undercutting, 467
deism, 207
Delaney, C.F., 311
demonstrative thoughts, 583–584, 591–592
DeRose, Keith, 346 n. 11, 424–425, 429, 443, 464, 478
Descartes, Rene, 53–79, 113–116, 251, 314–320;
cogito argument, 163–165;
and dream hypothesis, 57–59, 126–127, 334–337, 348–351;
and foundationalism, 21–22, 54–56;
God as deceiver hypothesis, 59–60, 69–72;
objection to his skeptical arguments, 124–127;
quasi‐empiricism of, 55;
view of science 72–74. See also Cartesianism
Devitt, Michael, 171 n. 23
direct acquaintance, 508, 513, 517–518, 521–523
direct realism, 68, 100–101, 254, 286–290
disagreement, 10, 14, 16–29
disjunctivism, 581–601;
contrasted with traditionalism, 582–584;
epistemological, 583–588;
and perceptual experiences, 582–583;
and recognitional abilities, 588–590
dismissive responses to skepticism, 116–117, 597
divine freedom, 71
divine hiddenness, 212
divine judgment, 206–207
dream argument, 353–366. See also argument from illusion
Dretske, Fred, 424, 438, 462–463, 469–471, 474, 507–508
Dummett, Michael, 291–292
Edwards, Paul, 369 n. 25
Elijah, 216
eliminativism, 231–233, 244 n. 2
empiricism, 85, 158, 201, 323, 330
epistemic circularity, 296, 303, 512–513, 517, 520–522
epistemic principles, 403–405
epistemic vs. social norms, 480
epistemological naturalism, 158, 560–561, 564;
in Pascal, 560;
in Reid, 293–295. See also Hume, David
epistemological realism, 327 n. 5
equipollence, 14–16, 559
equivalence thesis, 185–189
error theory, 230–231
Euthyphro, 216
evaluative properties, as supervening on descriptive properties, 343–345
evidentialism, 417
experience, analog and digital, 545;
as essentially relational, 590–593;
as having representational content, 534;
intrinsic character of, 590–592;
“looks” judgments, 583;
traditional conception of, 581–583;
veridicality of, 534
explanation, 59, 73, 88, 110, 139–141, 177, 181, 190, 195, 198 n. 30, 267–272, 397, 400, 411–413, 457, 533–556, 561–564, 571;
best available, 215–216;
and justification of induction, 139–140. See also inference to the best explanation
expressivism, 179, 181
external world skepticism, 108–128
externalism (epistemic), 25–26, 444–446, 504–532, 560–562;
compatibilism, 561–567;
incompatibilism, 563–567;
objections to, 511–518;
and Reid, 296–303
externalist turn, 559, 567
fallibilism 312–314, 429–430;
contrite, 311;
and Quine, 326 n. 5
fake barn case, 465–466, 468
Feldman, Richard, 435 n. 7, 507–509
finite mind objection, 489–490, 500
Five Modes of Agrippa, 10, 15, 17, 485
(p. 607) Fogelin, Robert, 89, 324–325
Foley, Richard, 413 n. 12, 566–567
foundationalism, 44, 301, 316–319, 495–500, 507, 513;
a priori, 487;
Aristotelian, 487;
Cartesian, 21–23, 54–55;
reliabilist, 487–488;
as a response to regress problem, 490, 498–499, 509–510;
and Wittgenstein, 372–373
Frankfurt, Harry, 55
Frege, Gottlob, 170 n. 14, 173 n. 40
Fumerton, Richard, 134, 490, 508
garbage chute case, 446, 448–449
generality problem, 46
Gettier, Edmund, 36–37, 437;
nature of Gettier's challenge, 568, 570–571
Gettier‐style examples, 438–439, 450, 479
Gibbard, Alan, 183–184, 189
Gilson, Etienne, 70
Ginet, Carl, 492–493, 495
God, 200–224;
alienation from, 205;
evidence of promises, 218;
evidence and salvation, 206–207;
mere existence arguments, 214–215;
as a title, 203
goldfinch‐woodpecker problem, 311, 350, 355
Goldman, Alvin, 299, 302, 462–463, 471, 509
Goodman, Nelson, 133–136, 146–147 n. 5, 367 n. 14
grace, cognitive, 208–209, 217–222
grandmother case, 443–444
Great Pumpkin objection, 513, 530 n. 67
green barn case, 465–466, 468
Grice, Paul, 359–360
grue, 133, 367 n. 14
Guéroult, Martial, 59
Gutting, Gary, 32 n. 24, 407–408
Guyer, Paul, 284 n. 37
Hawthorne, John, 428–432, 466–467, 474–475, 478
Heidegger, Martin, 117
Heller, Mark, 472–473
Hellinistic philosophy, 9–10
Henry of Ghent, 68
hinge propositions, 372–374
Hinton, J.M., 582
Holcot, Robert, 70–71
Hookway, Christopher, 575 n. 4
Horwich, Paul, 171 n. 24, 193
Howson, Colin, 133, 146 n. 1
Huemer, Michael, 527–528 n. 39
Hume, David, 80–107, 129–148, 330;
appearance argument, 111–113;
copy principle, 84–86, 291;
and Descartes’ method of doubt, 86–88;
epistemological naturalism, 87–88, 92–93, 293–295;
goal of the Treatise, 80–81, 94;
protoreliabilism, 96–97;
psychological impossibility of skepticism, 91, 103;
representative realism, 101–102;
response to his external world skepticism, 122–124;
skepticism about philosophy, 104–105
Incompatibilism. See compatibilism
indirect realism, 255, 258. See also realism, direct realism
indistinguishability arguments, 63–68, 70–72
induction, 129–148;
analytic defense of, 134;
Bayesian justification of, 141–142;
logical defense of, 134;
pragmatic justification of, 140–141;
reliabilist justification of, 143–144. See also problem of induction
infallibilism, 396, 400, 462, 568
infallibility, 312–314
inference to the best explanation, 139–140, 269, 289, 397, 412 n. 7, 544–545, 549
inferentialism, 395–397, 400–401, 403, 409, 514, 516, 519–520, 524
infinitism, 12, 494, 496–500
intellectual humility, 162
intelligible species, 68
internalism, 23–24, 504, 533–556, 561–562;
access, 44, 566;
criticisms of, 513–523;
inferential, 44;
strong awareness internalism, 509–510
invariantism, 417, 431, 505. See also Sensitive Moderate Invariantism (SMI)
isostheneia, 274
Jackson, Frank, 169 n. 11
Jesus of Nazareth, 209, 213
Johnson, Samuel, 259
justification, and contextualism, 423;
doxastic, 494–499, 525 n. 1, 526 n. 26;
endobasic and exobasic, 539–540;
externalist, 25–26, 134;
internalist, 23–24, 534, 564;
prima facie, 542;
propositional, 494, 525 n. 1;
and relativism, 403–411;
three skeptical theories of, 396–397
Kant, Immanuel, 170 n. 15, 265–285;
and the ancient skeptical tradition, 273–274;
on causality, 276;
and Hume, 275–279;
phenomena‐noumena distinction, 277–279;
reply to the dogmatist, 273–279;
skeptical method, 285 n. 45;
his understanding of the skeptic, 273–274
Kaplan, David, 170 n. 16
Kelly, Thomas, 32 n. 24
Kitcher, Philip, 171 n. 23
Klein, Peter, 12
knowledge and action, 357
knowledge as the norm of assertion, 432, 474–476
knowledge platitude, 184–196
knowledge, skeptical models of, 598
Kornblith, Hilary, 519
(p. 608) KR (knowledge of reliability) principle, 296–303, 508
Kripke, Saul, 170 n. 16
Kvanvig, Jonathan, 575–576 n. 12
Kyburg, Henry, 462
law of large numbers, 137–139
Lehrer, Keith, 298, 300–301, 338
Lemos, Noah, 302, 307 n. 26
Levi, Isaac, 316–318
Lewis, C.I., 288
Lewis, David, 346 n. 11, 423–424
libertarianism, 394
live hypotheses, 225–245. See also relevant alternatives
Locke, John, 251–252, 260–263
logical truths, skepticism about, 149–150
lottery case, 439–440, 448, 451–452, 462, 470
Lucullus, 66–67
Lycan, William, 340–342
Lynch, Michael, 401
Mackie, J.L., 133, 146 n. 1
Maddy, Penelope, 171 n. 23
Makinson, D.C., 462
Markie, Peter, 173 n. 35
McDowell, John, 379–380, 584–601
Medieval discussion of skepticism, 67–72
memory, problem of, 42
mentalism, 504, 508–509
metaepistemology, 35
method of doubt, 314–319
methodism: see particularism
Michalski, Konstanty, 75 n. 41
mind‐independent objects, 254, 257, 321–322. See also realism, external world skepticism
modal epistemology, 462–465, 473
modesty principle, 230
Montmarquet, James, 575 n. 10
Moore, G.E., 302, 330–347, 375, 380, 447, 463, 505, 535, 560
moral facts, accounts of, 179–196;
epistemic access to, 176–178, 193;
and sober quasi realists, 192
moral realism. See moral skepticism
moral responsibility, 394
moral skepticism, 4, 176–199
Moser, Paul, 507–508
Mother Teresa, 212
Nagel, Thomas, 222
neo‐Mooreanism, 447, 505, 560
neo‐Pyrrhonism, 559
Nicholas of Autrecourt, 68–69
nominalism, 318–324
Nozick, Robert, 424, 438, 442–445, 463–464, 469
Olivi, Peter John, 68
ontological responses to skepticism, 117–118
ordinary language philosophy, 349
other‐minds, skepticism about, 166, 584–588
particularism, 36–38, 40, 42–49, 345, 507
Pascal, Blaise, 560, 574
Peacocke, Christopher, 170 n. 16, 172 n. 30, 545–546
Peirce, C.S., 310–329;
criticisms of Descartes, 314–318;
epistemic optimism, 324–325;
and fallibilism, 312–314;
on nominalism, 318–322;
realism, 319–324
perception, 322–324, 331;
disjunctivism, 313, 454 n. 9, 581–601;
non‐inferential, 122–124;
and rationality, 592–595;
seeing as, 323. See also direct realism; experience; indirect realism
phenomenalism, 268, 288, 402
Plato, 36, 176, 216
Popkin, Richard, 276
Popper, Karl, 145
practical reasoning and knowledge, 429–430
practical role of knowledge, 12–13
pragmatic justification of induction, 140–141
pragmatism, 311, 312–318, 326, 407–409
preface paradox, 462
primary‐secondary quality distinction, in Descartes, 73;
Hume's rejection of, 102
principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), 394
Principle of Exclusion, 334–338
Prior Grounding Model (PGM), 570–572
Pritchard, Duncan, 388 n. 5, 558–559
problem of easy knowledge, 475
problem of induction, 129–148;
Hume's discovery, 89–90;
Hume's formulation of, 131–144
problem of pain and suffering, 204–206
problem of the criterion, 34–52, 87, 296
proper function, 505
Pryor, James, 302, 507, 520–521, 552 n. 39
Putnam, Hilary, 312–314, 328 n. 16
Pyrrhonian skepticism, 8–30, 62, 65, 87, 90, 97–98, 102, 324, 486, 488, 492–493, 495, 498–499, 558–559
Quine, W.V.O., 158, 161, 168 n. 1, 172 n. 32, 314, 326 n. 5
Quinton, Anthony, 489
Ramsey, F.P., 462
Ramsey's ladder, 185, 196
raven paradox, 132, 138–140
(p. 609) realism, alethic, 20–21, 27;
metaphysical, 20–21;
and Pierce, 319–324;
robust moral, 176–178, 182, 195;
about truth, 395. See also direct realism; indirect realism
reflective equilibrium, 48–49
regress problem, 10–13, 166, 490, 508, 510. See also Agrippa's Trilemma
Reichenbach, H., 140–141
Reid, Thomas, 286–309, 330, 560;
direct realism, 286–290;
epistemic principles, 295–303;
and evidence, 294–295;
experimentum crucis, 291–292;
externalism, 296–303;
first principles, 297–302;
nativism, 290–293;
naturalism, 293–295;
as a reliabilist, 299–300;
on total skeptics, 304–305;
use of ridicule, 286
relativism, 26–29, 392–414;
cultural, 399;
individual, 399;
about justification, 406–411;
metaphysical, 27;
and pragmatism, 407–409;
about truth, 398–403
relevant alternatives, 333–337, 463, 471–473;
ability to discriminate between, 125;
and agent reliabilism, 562–563;
and antiluck epistemology, 452–453;
and the live hypothesis principle, 238–239;
and virtue theory, 572. See also alternative possibilities
reliabilism, 25–26, 242–243, 405, 417, 505, 560;
Goldman‐style, 299;
pure, 492;
and Reid, 299–300
religious skepticism, 200–224
representation, 179, 184–187, 190–195
Riggs, Wayne, 561, 571, 575 n. 10
Rorty, Richard, 407–409
Russell, Bertrand, 204, 331–332, 545
Savage, L.J., 141–142
Schlick, Moritz, 291–292
Schmitt, Frederick, 520
Schroeder stair, 323
Scotus, John Duns, 68
secondary qualities, 73, 102, 328 n. 16
self‐evidence, 151–157, 165, 297–298
Sellers, Wilfred, 22–23
semantic blindness, 427–429
semantic skepticism, 290–292
Sen, P.K., 134
Sensitive Moderate Invariantism (SMI), 430–434
Sextus Empiricus, 9–10, 13–16, 25, 130, 485–486, 559
shmblack, 138
Sidgwick, Henry, 168 n. 5
sin, noetic effects of, 206–207
skeptical hypotheses, explanatorily inferior to real world hypotheses, 544–550;
live hypotheses, 226;
neutralization, 227;
and reliabilism, 242–243;
and subjective evidence, 241–242. See also brain‐in‐a‐vat (BIV)
skeptical models of knowledge, 598
Snowden, Paul, 582–583
sorites argument, 66–67
Sosa, Ernest, 309 n. 54, 435 n. 7, 446, 491–492, 561;
animal knowledge‐reflective knowledge, 309 n. 54, 490–491, 561, 566;
safety and closure, 464–471, 489, 560
Stanley, Jason, 425–427
statistical syllogism, 137–139
Stine, Gail, 471
Stove, D.C., 134, 138
Strawson, P.F., 135–136, 293
Stroll, Avrum, 388 n. 3, 372–374
subjectivism, 268–269
theory of ideas, 255, 286–290
Tiercelin, Claudine, 324–325
total skeptics, 304–305
track‐record argument, 46–47, 296, 303, 309 n. 53, 512, 517, 522
tranquility, 274
transcendental arguments, 265–274;
and the external world, 266–267, 269, 272–274;
Stroud's objection to, 267–273
transcendental idealism, 265–273
trust, 219
truth tracking, 424–425, 505
Unger, Peter, 428
underdetermination argument, 558–559, 566
value of skeptical arguments, 109–110, 117
van Cleve, James, 133, 146 n. 1, 508
varieties of skepticism, 82–84, 150, 200, 251, 286, 290, 411–412 n. 1
veridicality principles, 537–542
verificationism, 267, 314
virtue epistemology, 557–580;
taxonomy of theories, 565
virtue theory, 505
virtues, intellectual, 328 n. 21, 565, 571. See also virtue epistemology
Vogel, Jonathan, 144, 289, 507
volitional knowledge, 212–214, 220–222
Warnock, G.J., 352
Whitehead, Alfred North, 306 n. 8
William of Ockham, 70
Williams, Bernard, 328 n. 16
Williams, D.C., 137–139
Williamson, Timothy, 432, 435 n. 22, 466, 474–5
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 324–325, 372–391, 463, 551 n. 23
Wright, Crispin, 374–379, 384, 551 n. 13, 599–600
Yablo, Stephen, 173 n. 35
Zagzebski, Linda, 439, 561, 564, 575 n. 10, 576 n. 16, 577 n. 19
zebra‐mule case, 463, 469–470, 477, 599–601