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date: 28 January 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This article considers the epistemological significance of disjunctivism and its bearing on philosophical skepticism. It explains that disjunctivism is a way of thinking about perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge and it is also the view that judgments that characterize how experience appears to a subject is as if things have disjunctive truth conditions. It discusses the relation of disjunctivism with the tradition of the conception of experience and the concept of recognitional abilities.

Keywords: disjunctivism, philosophical skepticism, perceptual experience, perceptual knowledge, truth conditions, recognitional abilities

Alan Millar

Alan Millar is professor of philosophy at the University of Stirling.

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